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CHAPTER I 
Ilrl'RODUCTIOH TO.,WILliUJol JAMES 
" ' '.' .. :.~ 
The purpose ot this thesis i.~ ,an '.~po.i tion of William Jamea" 
"I', -, 
notion ot concept as proposed in tbePrinciples £! 'sycholoR and 
aa developed, by Jame.ta adoption ot ~'dical empiricism, in Some 
Problems g! Philosophl. The scope ot the thesia will be contined 
to only two ot the tour general tielda into which the writings of 
Jame. tall: namely, the fields of psychology and of the philosophy 
ot radical empiricism. Pragmati •• will be included only in as 
much as it further. the development ot the notion of concept in 
radical empirici... The fourth f1eld, that of James'. religioua 
writings, bas no direct 8ignifioance on the theais topic .nd vill 
not be oonsidered. 
Jame.'s philosophical temperament and ide.8 oannot be under-
stood properll. nor his difficulties and problems properly appre-
oiated, without a briet orientation to his empirical background. 
It is necessary, theretore, to consider the ide.s and the men vho 
influenced William James. 
Jame. began his acientitic studies at Harvard's Lawrence Sci-
entitic School in 1861 at the age ot nineteen. His tirst interest 
va. ch •• istry, but this 800n turned to biology, physiology, and 
1 
2 
medical studies. Porced by ill health to abandon hi. studies at 
Harvard, James went to Europe. He~e. in between rest cure. and 
medical ai4, he tried to continue hisph,.,ioloQ studies. At thia 
time, too, he turned to psychologJ', a.~be wrote that "it .eell.8 to 
~, ,.: 
Iciel1ce, • ..1 am going on to .~u.dy wbat is already known, and 
perhaps may b8.able to clo some work in 1t. aelmhol t. and a man 
named WUDdt at Heidelberg are workIng at it, and I hope I live 
through this winter to go to them In the summer,,,l 
When James graduated trom Harvard with a medioal degree in 
1869, he had studied all the aoiencea then known that dealt with 
man in his physical and psychical make-up. Bttt these ,tud1., bad 
lea. peraonal influence on him than did his teacher.. !WO men, 
Jettrie. Wyman, prote.,or of comparative anatom,. and ph7,iologJ, 
and Lqp1. Ala •• il, protelsor ot leolo,gr, Jamel oreditl tor their 
1napira*ion and help. These men creat_d a soientit1c attItude at 
Harvard that was oontemporary and prophetic, and It "waa thil eman-
Cipating influence, among all the torces ot hia time and plaoe, 
that mOlt deep1,. aftected William Jame. during the ,ears of hl, 
uni.er,it,. studie •• ,,2 Suoh a baokground and the ingrained scien-
t1tic approach ot his teachers early committed James to an a.pir1-
laalph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William 
Jamel (Boaton, 1935), II, ~ - --- --
2,oid. I, 205. 
l 
cal approach to psyoholo87 and Ph11osophy.) 
In 1872, James began his teaching career at Haryard as an in-
structor in anatomy and physio1ogr. By now, however, his intere.tl 
were in psychology, and ln 1876 he organlzed the tlrst psycho1og1-
cal laborato~ at Harvard. The suooe.s ot this laboratopy brought 
Jame. the reputation ot being one ot Amerlca'. leading P87cho1o-
gilts, even though there was much dlspute about the new physiologi-
cal psychology he prote.sed.4 
At this time Jam.s began to prepare the materlals tor hls 
Principles ~ PSlcholoSl, whioh was not published until 1890. In 
this book he make. reterenoe to the men who influenced him during 
the •• ,.eara. The dootrine. ot suoh men as Helmholtl, Wundt, Feoh-
ner, and Stumpt, ot the German Ichool, ot Charoot and Janet ot the 
Prenoh school; ot Bain, Carpenter, J. S. Mill, Darwln, Taine, and 
Spencer, ot the Brltilh group, tlgur., prominentl,. ln Jame.'. p.,.-
Oholog,..S The unlquene.. and importa~e ot James as the t~under 
ot Amerioan psyohology .temmed trom his ability to ohoo.e and piok 
what he thought good in the oontinental psyohologist. while adap-
ting the. into his own evolving .,.stem. Perry write. that "he 
benefitted by the new movements in German, Prenoh and English psy-
J!!!!., 468. 
4Ibid., II, 6. 
5Gardner Murph,., Historloal Introduction !it Modern PSloholorq 
(New York, 1949), p. 19~. 
4 
oholoQ without surrenderlng himself wholly to any ot them."6 
Bven at thia tlme Jameats philosophical interests were beg1n-
n1ns to absorb him. Among the men who inf'luenoed Jame., Per~f aa7. 
that aenou.vler was "the greatest slngl. influence upon James'. 
thought,but though Renouvi.~ was a protessed adherent of Kant, 
Jame. prized hlm for h1s Kant1an here.les rather than tor hia t1-
delit1e •• "1 As a &roup, however, the Brltish empirioists, Locke, 
Berkelef. Hume, an~ Mill, appeared to James as being "intellectu-
ally, aa well as praotically and morally, on the saner, sounder, 
and truer path. u8 Prom the tlme James began to write the Prinoi-
ples, he was also in contact with philosophers in Amerioa and on 
the continent. Hil alsoolationa with Chaunoey Wriaht, Charles S. 
Peiroe, and Josiab ROfoe were very olose. or the philosophera on 
the continent Jame. write. that he would not bave been emancipated 
from .any dilemmal he .aw "it I had n~t been intluenoed br a com-
" 
paratlvelf fOung and very o~l&inal Jr •• eh wr1ter, Professor Henr1 
Bergaon.,,9 
With the ide.s of a newly developed 8cience in his mind and 
with the stimUlation received from cont~ct with minds ot the past 
6'e1'17, II, 6. 
1~., I, 465. 
8Wl11lam Jamel, "Philosophioal Conceptions and Praotioal Re-
.ulta," Colleoted E •• a,! and aeview., ed. Ralph Barton Perry (New 
~ork, 19~), pp. 4l4-4 >.---
9wllliam J .... , A Plurali.tic Univer.e, ed. Ralph Barton Perr7 (New York, 1943), p. ~. 
and present, Jame. was encouraged and eager to test empiricism to 
soe it he could u.e it to an.wor the problema ho saw in philosoph7. 
Jam •• law the world as it prelent~d itselt to him in all its com-
plexit7,vltalit7, and ooncreteness. Continult7 was one ot the 
world's.oat striking characteristics which could not bo over-
looked. He oonstantl7 argued against those Ichooll ot thought 
which lett the traditional chasma in tho world unbridged or tried 
to bridgo them with elaborate .etaph78ical construotions.10 Sine. 
he saw the world in all itl tullnell, he strove to find a princi-
ple ot unity wIthin the pluralit7 that presented itselt. He dId 
not want a logical structure luperimposed trom without, but a com-
mon prInciple ot unit7 within the world ot h1s experience •. 
When, theretore, James began writing and teaching in psychol-
087. he aimed at gathering all the data and intormation ho could 
without correlatlng these within a p~ilosoph1cal tramework. In 
• 
the pretace to the Principle., James 8a78 that the disou88ion ot 
basie assumptions in psrcholo81 is metaph78ioal and is outside 
the purpose ho intends. "Thi8 book,fl he writes, flassuming that 
thought. and teelings exist and are vehioles ot knowledge. there. 
upon oontends that psyohology. when ahe baa asoertained the empiri-
oal oorrelation ot the various aorts ot thougt or tee ling with 
detinite conditions ot the brain. oan go no tarther--can go no 
farther that is, as a natural science. It she goos tarther ahe 
6 
beoomes metaphysical. nIl 
With this view ot psychology in mind, James rejeoted the as-
sooiationist and spl~itualist theories ot psychology. 'The asso~ 
ciationlst assumption that sensations are the simplest mental 
tacta 18 contrary, he thought, to the empirical method of invest1-
gation.12 James had some inclinations toward the spiritualist the .. 
ory, but he determined to pre.clnd trom them. ffIfit does not 
str1ctly exelain anrthing, it is at any rate les8 positively objec-
tioaabl. than e1ther mind-stutf or a material-monad creed. The 
-
bare PHENOMENON, however t l!1! IMMEDIATELY KNOWN thing which .2.!l19!. 
msnt~l !!!! !! !! apposition ~ ]h! entire brain-process ~ lh! 
state of consciousness and not the soul it.elt. hl) Jame •• the~.-
.;:..;;;.;;..;...;;;.- ---_.................... 
tore, chose a strictly positivistio point of view whioh he admit-
tedwaa anything but ultimate. Hovever, be telt that all the taot. 
must be gathered betore any satistac~ory metaphysioa1 explanation 
" 
could be had. Hls book "is mainly a mass ot desoriptive details, 
running out into queries which only a metaphysics alive to the 
weight ot her task can hope sucoessfully to deal vith. ftl4 
iPom Jamesls oonsiderations during the writing ot the Prinei-
Rl •• we can see that philo8opbJ was his ultimate goal. He could 
11Will1am James, ~ Principle. ~ PSlchologz (New York, 1890), 
I, vl. 
12Ibld., 224. 
-
1)Ibid., 182. 
-
l4Ibid., v1. 
-
7 
not pest with a merely scientific psychology. In the epilogue to 
his PSlcholoSl, the briefer course, published in 1892, James dis-
cussed psychology and philosophy. Hero he again admits the inabil-
ity ot psychology a. a natural science to giv6 ultimate answers. 
Here, too, he posed the proble.s that would force him to develop 
a phIlosophy ot his own. He telt that "the metaphysical puzzle. 
beoome the most urgent one. ot all. Psychology contributes her 
tull share of these; and I p1"opose in this last chapter to 1ndi-
cat. brietly which ot them .eem the more tmportant. ftl5 
The.e problems involve the correspondence ot two mutually 
distinot realIties suoh as we have In the l"elatlO,nshlp of knower 
and known, thought and thing, conoept and percept. In his PsZ-
Choloal James adopted psycho-physioal parallelism as a working hy-
pothesi. to serve psychology a8 a natural scienoe. He admitted, 
however, when he considered the phil~sophical implications, th.at 
" 
the correspondence ot the entire state'of' the brain to a uniqae 
state ot the mind "do •• very well till we begin to be metaphysioal 
and ask ourselves Ju.t what we mean by such a word a8 fco~~e.­
ponda. t "16 Jamests problem., therefore, become oong~u.nt in an .f-
tort to explain this cor~.8pondenoe, this union ot distinct reali-
ties. Hi, problem become. one ot tinding a unifying principle tor 
,ubjeot and object, thought and thing, concept and percept, in the 
15Wliliam Jam •• , P810h01081, ed. Ralph Barton Perry (Oleve-
land. 1948), p. 462. 
16Ib1d• 
-
8 
knower-known relationship. In other words, a subject has thoughts 
and concepta, the objeot ls a thing thought and a peroept conceiy-
ed, how can these dualities be unified in a basic common reality' 
From this statement of Jame.'s gen.ral problem, it is clear 
that the specific problem of this th.sls, James's notion ot con-
cept, is a part of his wider problem, Here the problem is ot cor-
respondence between concepts, which are discontinuous, immutable, 
and eternal, and the constantly changing, continuous tlow ot ex-
perienoe. How oan these distinct realitie. be unitied? In the 
exposition of James'. notion ot concept, theretore, it will be 
necessary to touch on hls solution ot the broader problem. 
In the division ot this thesis the second chapter wlll dis-
cuss James's analysis ot the elements ot consciou.ness in the 
stream ot thought. From this analysis arises, tor James, the pos-
sibility ot knowledge. Following thia necessary orientation, the 
., 
concept as a partIcular type of knowledge will be pre.ented and 
developed. This chapter will consider Jame.'s notion ot concept 
from the vantage point ot psychology. The third chapter wl1l deal 
with the tormulation and deyelopment ot radioal empiricism'. phil-
osoPh1 ot pure experience as the unifying principle which James 
proposed as the solution to the general problem, and to the prob-
lem ot the peroeptual and conceptual worlds. Pragmatism will be 
disoussed a8 a special teature of radical empir1cisM in regard to 
the meaning and truth of ooncepts. A discussion of how pure ex-
perience solves the problems ot the concept and enriche. the no-
~------------------------------------------------------------~ 
9 
tion ot concept will be the matter of the tC'Jurth chapter. Some 
general conclusions, eonside~atlons, and comparisons with scholas. 
tic notions of concept will make up thetitth and final ohapter. 
CHAPTEft II 
OONCEPT AS FOUND AND DBVEtOPED ~. THE PRINCIPLES 
In the Prinoiple., as we lndicate'din the tirst ohapter, 
James proposed to treat psyohology as a natural .cienoe which "a.~ 
sum.s a. It. data 1) thoughts !a£ tee1iggs, and 2) a phlsloal 
world in time and spaoe with which they coexist and which 3) thel 
know."l The.e three are the t aots ot mental lite that Jame. will 
-
de.l with in his .tudr ot p.rohologr. There are, however, other 
h1poth •••• which James postulat •• as usetul tor the tull under-
standing ot the intrioate workings of tinite mental aotlvlt7. 
James's first hypothe.is oonsidered mants mental faoulties as 
instruments adapted to seoure satety and prosperIt7 In the complex. 
itT ot the world. The oonsequent Interaction resulting b&tween tht 
world and manta conscious activity brought James to an opinion, 
which showa Darwin'. Influence, that "mind and world ••• have 
been evolved together, and in oonsequence are something ot a mu-
tual tit."2 The chiet result or this evolutionary view ot .ental 
lwi11iam James, Ie! PrInciples £! PSlcholoSl (New York, 1890), 
I, 1'i. 
2willlam James, PSloholoSl, ed. Ralph Barton Perry (Cleve-
land, 1948), p. 4. 
10 
u 
lite 1s "the gradually growing conviction that mental lite is pri-
marily teleological; that is to 8a~, that our varlous ways ot 
reeling and thinklng have grown to b. what they are because ot 
their utility in shaping our reactions on the outer world. H3 
A .econd hypothesis whioh Jame. postu1at.d tor h1me.lt in wr1-
ting the Prlnoie1.. was "that •• ntal actlon may be unlformly and 
abaol"tel, a t\lDctlon ot brain-action. ...arylng as the latt.r var-
ies, and being to the braln-actlon as ottect to cause."4 fbi. 
last hJpothe.ls is fundamental to the phy.lological p.,cho1ogy tor 
which James bad been preparing him.o1t tor years. 
Even thauah J .. es admitted that the •• two postulat •• were 
on11 working bypoth •• es, and although he adapted and 11mi ted the. 
over t he year., his empiricism forced hlm to treat the •• postulate. 
a8 tacts ot experlence. In tact, much ot Jamests later philoso-
phizlng wal an attempt to tit the ta~ts ot common •• n •• experience 
Into the tramework ot the •• hypoth •••• ,· d •• pite hi. prote.tation 
that he wi.hed to avoid all a rtlt1cial tramework •• 
Betore Jame. began hi. torma1 I tud1 ot the olements ot con-
sclousne.s and Intellection, he made a tew observatlons on the 
mind as an object In a world ot other objeots that has relatlon-
ships wlth tho.e other objects. Even though Jame', the psycholo-
gist, con.idered the relatlon ot knowing to be "the most mJsterl-
310id. 
-
4Ibid., 6. 
12 
oua thing 1n the wo~ld, it is an ultimate relation that must be 
admitted whether it be explained or not."' Theretore, the pay-
cholog1.t's attitude toward cognition must be a complete dualis. 
whioh aupposes two elements, mind knowing and thing known, and he 
must treat the. as irreducible. Thus, "the dualism ot Objeot and 
Subject and thei~ pre.established harmonr are what the psyoholo-
giat as suoh .. at aa ... _, whatever ulterior monistic philoaopb7 
he .a,.. &8 an individual who haa the right to be a metaph,.sician, 
bave in reaerve.,,6 
James began his ps,.chology ot intellection with an intro-
spective anal1sis ot the ele.ents ot consciousness, This analr. 
sis gave rise to his Itream ot conlciou.ne.s, which was one ot 
James'l origlnal oontrlbutlons to psychology_ Much ot the data 
presented In this anal,.sia had been gathered over the ,.ears and 
had been published in outline torm in. 1884 in an article entltled 
"On So.e Omissiona ot Introspective Pa,chologr." 
Betore beginning his ana17sia, Jamea looked tor the primary 
datu ot experience. He thought he tound thls ele .. ntlU7 tact In 
the "conerete tact whlch e.err one w1l1 aftirm to belons to his 
inner experience, • • • the tact that .c.on.8.0.1.0.u.8.n.8.8.8 ~ !!!! !S£! 
rStates ot ~ndt succeed eaoh other in him. It W8 
-. ............ p -...-.-
could .a1 in English '1t thInks,' ••• we should be stat1ng the 
>; .... , Prinoiple. I, 216. 
6Ibid., 220. 
-
13 
tact moat simply and w1th the minimum of assumption."7 
Proc •• ding empirically 1n h1s analfsis, James noted fiye 
characteri.tics ot the .procels o~tho\lght% that every thc>ught 
seems to be part ot a personal conSOi0118ne8a; that thought 1s 
always changing within each personal e01'l8oiousnelsJ that thought 
1a senalbly concinuous within each.personalconaciousnessJ that 
thought deal. with objects independent or itselt; that thougat, 
finally, 1. interested in lome parts ot its objects to the exclu-
sion at other part •• 8 
Taking up the first point, James writes that "it s •• ms as It 
the el ••• ntaPy psychic tact were not thossht or !h!! thought or 
~ thousht, but !l thossht, eyery thought being owned."9 Thi. 
psyohic tact brings men to admit a personal mind or selt whOle 
existenoe cannot be questioned. This personal .elf is not a per-
manent SUbstance underlying thought. :. It is nothing essentiall,. 
d1fterent tram anything to be tound 1Drthe procesalon ot changing 
thoUghts. lO 
Jame.'. lecond characteristic ot thought 1. that "~_s_ta_t_e_ 
.2!!!!. lione .!!!l recur ~ ~ identical !!!!h. what .u .!!!. betore. ,,11 
7James, PSIchololl, p. 152. 
8Ib1d• 
-
9James, ~rinclpl.8 I, 226. 
lOIbld., 226-227_ 
11~., 2)0. 
In other words, the same senaation once had can never be telt a-
gain. It there seems to be a sameness in two difterent states of 
consciousness, this doe. not come from the sensation repeated, but 
from the same object gotten twice. l2 
This 1s true, because, on introspection, th~ same sensation 
is not quite the same as it was before. The same object may be 
sensed,butthe new relations and context cbange, to some degree, 
the original senaation. This tollows from the assumption that 
every sensation corresponds to .ome cerebral action. Since the 
brai~ is being constantly modifled. there must be a corresponding 
change in the concomitant sensation. l ) Each new state ot the 
brain is determined DT the state. that have preceded it, so tht. 
growing modification makes Identical sensations impossible. Jame. 
concluded, theretore, that "experience ia remoulding us eveP1 mo-
.ent, and our mental reaction on e.er.r given thIng is real11 a 
resu.ltant of our experIence ot the who'!e world up to that "date. "14 
It 1. this theory ot experienoe, based on pa,slologlcal data, 
that made it impossible tor James to tollow either Locke or Her-
bart, who "formulate the mental tacts in an atomiatic 8o~t ot wa7. 
and treat the higher states ot consciousness .s it the, were all 
bu.ilt ou.t of unchanging ideas •••• These ideas are !.!. ntho-
12Ibld., 231. 
-
l'Ibld •• 233. 
-
lll-Ibid., 2)6. , 
1S 
~o,loal !n ent1t% !! 1b! J!Ok i! spades. ftlS It psycb?lociata do 
not anal,..e the elements of consciousness, but assume this atomls-
tio viewpoint, the result "1. the Humlan doctrine that our thought 
1s composed of separate Independ9nt parts and il not a sensibly 
continuous ltl'e ... ,,16 
James bec1ns bis analya!. ot the third oharacter1stic or 
thought by detlnlnc "'continuous' as that whtcb. 1s without breach, 
oraok or div1s1on,_l1 Intro.peetlon reveala two types or breaks 
in thought. Thore could be time-saps between Itat •• ot oonscious-
ne.1 1 tor example, the lap •• ot consciousness during sl.ep. Or 
there could be a qual1tative break so stro~~ that two .ucc •• ding 
atat •• or oonsoiouane.s had no conneotlon whatever. But intra-
.paot1on also :re.e.ls two thIns' about the.e br!'aka: "1. That 
e.en where there 1. a time-sap the coneolousness atter it t.els 
as it it belonged together with the ~on.olou.n.'8 before 1t, .a 
" 
another part ot the same selt, 2. That:'the chang •• from one mo-
ment to another in the quality ot the consoiousness are never 
abaolute1r abrupt."18 
In anaIr.ing the first of the two breaks, the t1me-gap, J .... 
reoognized the tact that, though ooneo!oueness 18 broken, 1t 1a 
1510\4., 2..36. 
161b1<1., 231. 
111)14. 
lSzo14. 
16 
not broken 80 oompletely that thero 1s a DeW .ett who cannot ~e­
member a paat exiatence. Thi. uni t1 amid aenalb11 continuous 001'1-
sciouaness Jame. attributed to tbe unity ot a common selta 
This oommunlt7 or .elt 18 ~~t the time-gap oannot br.ak 
11'1 twaln, and i8 wbJ • present tho~t, although not 11-
norant ot the time-gap, can stl11 regard It.elf 8S con-
tinuous with certain chosen portions ot tbe paat. 
Conaciousness, then, does not appear to itsolt 
chopped up 1n b1te. Such words .a 'chain' or 'train' 
do not dese:rlbe 1t .titlJ as it presents ltselt in the 
tl~.t lnatanoe. It 1. nothing jo1nted; it flows. A 
'r!yez-' or • 'aa-eam' are the metapllors bY' which 1t ta 
moet natural11 de.oribed. In talkl~ ot II bareatter, 
lot U8 call 1t 'hI ,tre, .e! ttiougfi~ or conscloWlnes,J.I 
.2£ C"u§J:eotrv! .=,W.. t 
~bo.e who would claim tbat the .eoond t7Po ot break 11'1 con-
t1nult1. tbe sudden oontrasts 11'1 tho qualit,y ot thought, ao al-
ters oonsoiousn ••• that it 1. completely dirterent are 8uilt7 ot 
contuslon, or ot " ••• perticial introspective y1ew. w20 The con-
tuslon here i. between the thoughts the .. elye., which, taken .a 
8ubjeotiye tacta, are continuous, and the tbiftga, whioh a •• d1e-
.' 
crete and discontinuoua, "tba tranait10n between the thought ot 
one obJeot and the thought ot another 1. no roore a break 1n the 
thoWl than a J01nt 1n a bamboo is a break 11'1 the wood. I t i. 
part ot the consci6usness a8 muoh a. the joint 1. part ot the 
bamboo. nIl 
.0 matter bow v10lent tbe ohange ot thought nor how complete. 
19Ib1d., 239. 
2Otb1!!., 240. 
21Ibid, 
11 
11 dltterent the termini ot tbe thought, tbe change 1. ~adual. 
This 1. true because "aa tbe total neurosis change., so doe. tbe 
total psychosls ohange. But.a the change. of neurosis are naVel' 
absolute11 dlsoontlnuous, so muat the sucoe.slve psyobo.e. shade 
graduall1 1nto eaoh other, although tbeir rate of ohange mar be 
muob taster at one moment tban at the next."22 The supertlclal 
introspect!" •• 1ew bas overlooked th._ atfinitles that are present 
be~Y •• n dl~t.rent tboughts. EYen our lansuase work. againat U8 
here top ~e name oup thoughts staplr, eaob at~er it. tblng, .s 
1t • .&oh. kn • ., t. t. own tbing aM nothing .l.e. What e8Gb real11 
knows 1. 01e.r11 the tb1nS 1t 1. named top, with cU.II11 perhaps 
a thouaand other tb1nga. n2) 
'fbi. ihaight is a flash ot Ja.s's 8-1u, and one ot hi. 
primal'1 oontrlbutions to the analfsis ot oonsclouan •• e. !bi. 
insiaht led Jam.. to two oonslderatl~. wbich were important tor 
hi. p.,obololJ ot thousht, and oon •• qu'ntly ot oonceptlon. !he •• 
two 001181d.1'8tl01'18 are. (1) the wanaitl.e and. eub.tantl.e pute 
ot consclouene.8, and (2) the trlna- of oon.oiousn.... Baoh of 
th •• e will b. taken up and developed in turn. 
Jame., analJ'alnc tb. thoUSbt p!'Oc ••• , cOllPared. 1 t vl tb the 
tllabt ot a bad .ade ot flan a1 tenatloD ot tllabte and perohing •• -1+ 
22]:1»14. , 2!,3. 
231b14., 241. 
241b1d. , 243. 
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He described this more full,. when he wrote that "the resting-
places are usually occupied by sensorial imaginations of some 
sort, whose peculiarity is that th.,. can be held before the mind 
tor an indefinite time, and contemplated without changing; the 
place. ot flight are tilled with thoushts ot relations, statio 
or dynamic, that tor the most part 'obt'td,ln between the matter con-
templatea in the periods of compa~atlv. rest."as Substantive 
part. is the name given to the resting-place., and the places ot 
flight are called the transitive parts ot the stream. 
It i. almost impossible to recognize these trans!tive parts 
ot the stream trom introspection. The process of thought usually 
rushes on to the substantive parts so quickly that the transitlve 
parts cannot be tocused on. It tbe psyohologist succe.ds In lso-
lating a transitlve part, in that very act it becomes a substan-
t!ve part. 
Because ot this Inability to tindthe tranaitive parts ot 
the stream through. introspection, the sensationalists and intel-
leotualists denied their exiltence. The lensatlonallsts, unable 
to dlscover any t •• lings corr •• ponding to the relations and torms 
ot connection in the world, denied th&t teelinas ot relation ex-
i.t. Hume even went 10 tar as to deny that thore are any rela-
tions out ot the mind. The intellectualists, on the other hand, 
could not deny the realit,. ot these external relationa, but they 
19 
oould not pOint out any distinct relations actually exIsting. So 
they. too, denied that these tee lings of relations exist. 26 
James.s reaction to these erroneoua positions was a strong 
atfirmation that "it there be suoh things as tee1ings at all, then 
!2 sure11 a! relations between objeots exist !a rerum natura, A2 
surell, ~ .!.2£!. surelI, ~ feel ips. exist !.2. whioh these £.!l!.-
tions are knovn. n21 Jame. had named the.e switt motions of con-...;;;.;;; ......... __ ,;0;;;;; •..;...,;;,00_ 
aolousness transitive atates and compared their continuity to that 
ot the brain. "AI the brain-ohanges are oontinuoU8, so do all 
these consclou.snes.es melt into each other like d.1ssolving views. 
Properly they are bat one protracted consoiousness, one unbroken 
stream. ,,28 
There is another type ot unnamed "state ot consciousness" 
which is just a8 important and just a8 cognitive a. the transItIve 
states, and just .s maoh unrecognize4 by traditional psychologle •• 
" As an example ot tni •• econd, unnamed ,state, James oonsidered the 
ettort to recall a torgotten name. There is a gap that is to be 
overcome, but it is a lap which i8 intense1} active. The ettort 
to reoa11, the tal ••• tart., the name on the tip-ot-the-tongu. are 
signs ot this activity. This activity led Jam.s to consider that 
"the tee1ing of an ab.ence is !!i! coe10 other than the ab •• nc. 
26Ibid., 244-24S. 
-
27Ibid., 24S. 
-
281bi4., 247-248. 
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ot a tee1inc_n29 
It 18 this teeling, activitr. or tendency that James consid-
ered so important. Because oonsciousne.s la continuous. no one 
part ot lt can be in complete laolationfrom the rest. Each ele. 
ment or con8clo~.ne8s contains ln It •• 1f a retrospective and a 
prospective t.~d.no1. In the present ana1ysls J&mes is discussing 
the importance of this tendency_ 
Thi. second, unnamed state is directional. It cons1at. ot 
psychic transitions whose function is to lead trom one set ot im-
age. to another. Because ot its transitory character, just .s 
that ot the transitive stat •• , it 1s lost in int~ospeetion. But 
it i8 none the less real. In fact, a good part ot our psychic 
lite con.iats in .uch rapid premonitory perspective viewa of 
80hemes of thought not yet articulate.)O 
The •• "fe.1ings or tendencr." a., Jame. called them, are ot-
" 
ten vague, but the,. are part ot a pictUre ot mental lit. which is 
more oorrect than that of psyohologists who deny any except per-
fectly distinct imag... James de.cribed hi. own po.it1on in eon-
treat with the traditional one when he wrote that: 
The traditional psychology talks like one who should 
say a river con.ists of nothing but pailsful, spoons-
ful. quartpotsful, barrelsful. and other moulded torms 
ot water. EYen were the pails and the pots all actual-
17 standing in the .tream, still b.tween them flows the 
fre. water of consciousness that PS7ohologists re.olute-
29Ibld., 252. 
-
lOIbid., 2$3. 
-
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17 oyerlook. Eyery detinite image in the mind is steeped 
and dyed in the tr.e water that flow. round it. With 
it goes the sen •• ot its relations, near and remote, the 
dying echo 01.' whence it came to us, the dawning sens. 
ot whither it is to lead. The signiticance, the value, 
ot the image i8 all in this halo or penumbra that sur-
rounds and escorts it, --or rather that is tUled into one 
wi'\thit and has beeo .. bone ot it., bone and tlesh 01.' its 
tlesh, leaving it, it is true, an image ot the eame itiM it was before, but making it ',an 11Iase 01.' that 
ng newly taken and freshly underatoad.Jl 
James's p.ycho-phyaioal hypothesis led him to believe that 
there was a corre.ponding physioal reaction to this psychic phen-
omenon. Theretore he named thil state ot consciousness a "psychic 
overtone," or a "fringe," in order "to designate the influence ot 
a taint bre.in-proeess upon our thought, as it makes it aware ot 
relations and objects but dimly pereeived."32 
James loes on to list four important oharacteristics ct this 
notion of the fringe of consciouaneae. The tirst ot theae is that 
there is a reason tor t he distinction, between knowledse 01.' aoquain 
., 
tanee and knowledge-about. The Iringe:' Is what distinguishes these 
two types of knowledge. When the tringe 1s present, lmowledge is 
more complete. This complete, knowledge-about 11 knowl.dge of the 
relations ot a thing, and these are only found in the fringe. l ) 
This awareness of the object's relations, as Jame. atates, oome. 
only in the "penumbral nasoent waT of a • fringe , ot unartloulated 
.32I014 •• 2S8. 
-
331014., 2$9. 
affinitIes about It. n34 
This sense ot atflnlty 1s a second feature or the stream ot 
thought derived from the notien of the frlnge. In all thinklng 
there is some topic or subject about which the members of the 
thought revolv8. The relation oftbe other members to the topic 
is felt in the fringe, and particularly the relat10n ot harmony 
and discord. ot furtherance or hindrance ot th, topic. It the re-
lation is haFmonious, it positively furthers the thought; 1t d1s· 
oordant, it lnitiate. or continue. the search tor harmonious rela-
t1ons. If these relations lead us to the conolusion ot a train ot 
thought, there is "meanins, or, as we say, the topic of thought."'! 
Slnce .eaning is ~h. most important part ot the stream, the var10w 
relations used to reach it are relativ.ly unimportant.36 
From this notion of meaning James formulated his idea that 
thinking is only a teleologlcal instr,ument. "The reader se •• 0,-
this time that it makes little or no ditterenee in what sort ot 
mind-stuff, in what qualitJ of imagery, his thinking goes on. !he 
only image. +n~r~nslcBll1 important are the halting-p1aoes, the 
substantive conclusions, prOVisional or tinal. of the thought. 
Throughout all the rest of tn. stream, the f •• lings ot relations 
are everything, and the terms related almost naught. These te.l-
34Ibld. 
-
3'sIbld., 260. 
36Ibid., 259-260. 
-
lOIS ot relation, these psychic overtonea, halos, suffusions, OP 
fringes about the terms may be the same in very different systeMs 
of imagery.tt.37 
With the notions of the transitive states and the fringe, 
Jam.1I explains "the sensible contlnulty and l,lnity ot our thought 
as contrasted with the apparent discreteness ot th& words, Images, 
and other means by which it ~eems to be oarried on. Between all 
their substantive element a there is ttransitive- eonsclousnes~, 
and the words and images are 'fringed,' and not as discrete as to 
a carelese .iew they may se.m.").8 
Tne amount of space James gives to the explanation of thought 
as sensibly continuous warrants the detailed analYSis given aboT •• 
Also, what has been discussed above is the groundwork tor e more 
complete discussion ot the concept. 
Th.e fourth oharacter1.stic James .attributed to human thought 
is that it appears to deal with. objects independent of itself. 
Our common sense leads us to accept the extra-mental existence ot 
the objeots of our mind b.caus~ we perceive that ~th.r. are ~ 
human thoughts, each with the same objeets. tt39 In conneetion with 
-
knowledge ot objeots independent of the mind. James discusses two 
erronflOUS opinions prevalent at the time. The first is "that the 
37Ibid., 269" 
38Ibidv, 271, 
-39Ibid~ 
-
retlective consciousness ot the .el.f is essential to tht> cognitIve 
.function of thought."40 In other words, the wind, in order to 
know, must expressly distinguish between the things which it knowe 
and it.elt. James denied this oonsciousness as essential to 
thought, then added that "thous;ht mal, !ll!l!!!!.9. !l2l. in knowing, 
discriminate between 12 Object ~ itsf>lf. T'4l 
James also objected to those who misuse the word "object," 
and take it to indicate only the "substantil'e kernel or nucleus 
of the conseiousness."42 For example. tn the sentence flColumbus 
discovered Amel'iea in 1492," 1110St people would say that the objeot 
of the mind is the word "Columbus," or "America,~ or "disoovered." 
James maintained that it was none of these, but th. entire .en-
tence or context. To get the proper object, each word of a .en-
tenee must b. aoneidered with. its fringed relations. "The object 
of every thought, then , is neither ~or. nor lese than all that 
the thought thinks, exactly as the thought thinks it, however com-
pl1ce.t.d. the l\latter, and however symbolic the manner of the thInk-
ing may be."4J 
Even if the objeot is oomplex. the thought of it is one un-
divided state ot consciousness. James argued against t~e asso-
401b1d., 
-
274. 
411b1d •• 
-
275. 
42Ibld. 
-
4J1bid• , 
-
276. 
olatlonlsts who try to reach a unity out of the elementary dis-
tinot Ideas. Thero was a foreshadowing ot gestalt psychology pre-
sent when James insisted t1:lat "whatever things !!!.!. thouSht !.e. !:!. ... 
lation !£.!. thoue,h.!? !!:.2!Tl !h!. outset in !. unlt;r, 1.!!..! sinele puIs. 
!2!. sUbJecj:1.vi ty, !. 81nsl~ E-s:rohos 1s, fefl11np;, .2!: stat!t .of ~. ,,44, 
.'. This unity of the entlro thought tR l?r~gent in each word of the 
sentence. Though each word is discrete, the fringe of the word 
as spoken in the sentence continues the unity of meaning. "No 
word in an understood sentence comes to consciousness as a mere 
noIse. We feel its meaning as it passes; and although our object 
differs from one moment to 9nother as to its verbal kernel or nu-
claus, yet it 1s s1milar thPoughout the entire segment of the 
stream. ,,4S The reason for this un:tt~ .. lles in the consubstantiall-
ty of the individual words and the entire meaning. "They are made 
ot the eame 'mind stuff,' and form a~ unbroken etream. n46 
The flfth and final character1 stU~ o~ the etream is that flit 
is always interested more in one part o~ its object than in an-
other, a~d welcomes and rejects, or ohooses, all the while It 
thinka.,,47 Just as each sensation is seleoted from an "undis-
tingulshable, swarming oontinuum, devoid of distinotion or empha-
T •• 
44Ibid. , 278. 
4.$Ibid., 281. 
46Ibid. , 282. 
-
47Ibid. , 
-
284. 
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818,.48 by our sense organs, so thG mind chooses to suit itself, 
and decides what partIcular sensation shall be helc. :~i()rC real and 
valid than all the rest. The mind 1rJorks on the matter of thought, 
the chaos of sensatIons, as a sculptor work. 011 a stattlo. "The 
world we feel and live in will be tha.t which our ancestors and we, 
-
by slot.fly cumulative strokes ot' choice, have extl"icated out ot 
': 
th1s, 11ke sculptors, by simply re jecting c,ertain po:r-tions of the 
given 8tutf.,,49 
James's analysis of thought in the st:r-eam of eonsclous~ess 
has been developed at some length. This 1s important for the pur-
pose ot this ~esis, because consciousness 1s the basic element of 
all thought. From his an~~ysI8 ot' thInking James concluded to the 
possibility ot' knowledge. 
The possibilIty ot' knowledge Is P. fundamental psychl0 pecu-
liarity Which James named It'!h.!. llrlna1ple 2! eonstanc.z 1!:! !h! 
mind's meani~s,' and which may be thus exp~essed: 'The same mat-
.....-...-... .........................--. ........... 
~.~ ~ be thoui2ht ~ .!!! suceessi ve I?orti?ns .2!. lli _!ll .... e..... n_tB_l ..... stream, 
~.!2!! .2! these portions .£!!! ~ that they ~ ~ ~ !!!1-
1m ~~lch ~ othE'?!: Eortions meant.' ,.SO James insisted that this 
is a psyehologiea1 prInciple which the mind may use whether the!'e 
be any real sameness 1n thinss or not. As far as mental lIfe goea, 
48~. 
49Ibid., 289. 
-
50Ib1d., 459. 
-
bowever, "this sense 2! sameness is the very keel and backbone of 
our thinking_"Sl 
Once James has explained the possibility ot knowledge 1n the 
stream by the identification or two thoughts as the same, he has 
set the stage tor a discuasion ot two gen&l'al types of knowledge 
ot which men are conscious, "knowledge 2! aCiuaintanee and ~­
ledge-about .• ,,52 Knowledge ot aoquaintance is superficial. It is 
a passing knowledge, a knowledge which knows ~ an object is 
present, but not !h!1 it is. Knowledge-about is deeper and more 
complete. It knows the ~ of an object as well .s the !e!l-
James looked on knowledge of acquaintance as the beginning of cog-
nition, and knowledge-about as its completion. Knowledge-about 
is gotten through anallsis ot and ooncentration on the fringe re-
lationa ot the subject. The thoughts arising from knowledge-about 
are conoepta. Knowledge of aoquaint-.nce, on th.e other hand, i. a-
kin to sensation or peroeption, and is,· "the knowledge more proper 
to the stream. Thus, Jame. oontended that "all the elementary na-
ture. of the world, together with the kinds ot relation that sub-
.ist between them, .. st either not be known at all, or known 1n 
this dumb way ot acquaintanoe without knowledge.about."S) 
James's emp1r1cism,acoording to Perrr, led him to conslder 
511b1d. 
-521014., 221. 
-
S31bid., 221-222; also, ct. above pp. 19-20. 
-
r __ ------------~ 
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human experience as narrower than human knowledge. Thus, know-
ledge ot aoquaintanoe is within e.xperie~oe, and knowledge-about 
passes beyond experience. Perry point. to James's contention that 
"~h1l. both kinds ot knowledge. are indispensable, knowledge b,. ao-
quaintance 18 oompleter and more conclu.ive than knowledge-about, 
" ~ 
the lat~er being a substitute or adj~ot .hich is required in or-
der to overcome the l1mited range ot the tormer."54 
James's detailed analysis ot consoiousness presented the ele-
ments common to thought and the groundwork ot knowledge. From 
this analr8is he explained how knowledge could arise through the 
principle ot conltancy 1n the mind's meanings. Atter his discuI-
sion ot two general types of knowledge, James is prepared to dis-
CUIS one particular type, knowledge-about, 'or coneept. 
James defines oonception as "the tunction by whioh we thus 
identit,. a numerioally distinct and p~rmanent subject ot dis-
.. 
course. ,,55 The subject of disoourse, therefore, becomes numerical-
11 distinct and permanent when it is marked ott from, or singled 
out ot, the world ot complex experience, James preferred the word 
conception to concept. For his, concepts were the thoughts which 
are the .,.hlales ot oonception, but theJ' were not the objects ot 
the disoourse. "The word 'oonoeption,'" he wrote, "is unambiguou. •• 
It properly denote. neither the mental state nor what the mental 
S4aalph Barton Perry, !s!S! Spirit £! William James (New 
Hayen, 1938), p. 45. 
5>James, Prinolples I, p. 461, 
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.tate signifies, but the relation between the two, ~.l11 the 
t1l1'1otlon ot the mental state 1n Sl~~l~*:~ just that partioular 
-,' '.>' ,". ':~":':').':'f 
thing. n>6 0n.oeJamea hal defined #~e~~~ion., he discusses its 
;~ ~'~}~:~' ,:~; 'j ~~~'~~; :~;~~:. 
properties a,n4characteristics .,:·F",·' 
" ~ ". •...... '&;' ,·.,.;~,:L.:): 
The (,t;tPlt.'pl'Opert1 ot oonoept.~~'·'·~'1 ts u.n1quent.a. It i. 
, '". ' . !~. < "/:-';. 
..":','"" ,~,>") 
one thlng:Qd "nothing el.e--nothiljg; , that is, Instead ot 
":";'-. ,.<:.:.,.".,::"',.' , ~Li;;·,·:~:~;;·,)t; 
that, tho~i\t'i,\;t:"'maT, be otmllch elsf~t.;lri:dltlon to that. u57,At..i., 
.: ',- ," ;' '. " ~r~ '.(,' " .":'\>~:"\ " 
tention 8,j.tl!le. yd:u't and identitlescone?~~ement trom the mult.ipl1-
It focules o1'1"t~e;tiJcle\lS or kernel ot the 
thought, and pre8cinds, as muoh a.:po, • .fble, trom 
fringe. :Since there must be some pos1tl-te identitication ot toe 
object, .ome distinguishing mark, tne.s.ential point of conceptio 
1. that ane1::tject so singled out ttahould,be re-1dentltled by \'lS 
a. that whioh the talk is about, and no tull representation ot 1t 
is necessar,. tor this) even when it le,a tul1,. representable 
thing. ft58t 
Becaae the concept is 1so1at.d tro. the stream ot thought, 1t 
l"e1Calns etet'nal11 what it is and oan never change. This is the 
second propert7 ot the conoept. The mind ma,. change states IU'ld 
56Ib1d., 461. In Some Problems ot Phllo.opAl, p. 48, James 
sa18 he-use. 811'10nymS tor the words concept and percept. rt'Idea,' 
'thought,' and 'intellection' are s1nonJmOus with 'concept.' In-
stead ot 'percept' I shall otten apeak pt 'sensation,' 'teellng,' 
'intuitlon,' and sometimes ot 'sensible exper1ence' or of the '1m-
mediate tlow' ot consoious llte." 
57James, Principles I, 461. 
58Ibid., 46.3. 
)0 
its meanings, at various times, but "the world ot conceptions, or 
things intended to be thought about, atands stltt andlmmutabl., 
like Plato's Realm ot Idea •• n$'9 
Ho one can den7 that knowledge grows and ohanges, but Jamea 
thought that those psyohologists wh.o claim that concepts evelve 
trom within were incorrect. He though.t t;hat concepts did not grow. 
, ,'.~ 
but knowledge groWl with new conoep:f; ••. When a concept is present, 
it ma,. su.ggest or instigate a new act ot attention which will re-
ault in a new concept. Hew oonoepta, however, do not evol •• trom 
older oonoepts, the,. "oome trom neW aensations, new movements, new 
emotion., new associations, new acts ot attention, and new compari-
sons ot old conceptions, and not in other w.,. •• "60 The reason tor 
thta unchangeableness ot conoeption is to be tound in the very na-
ture ot concepts. Being singled out ot perceptual experienoe and 
~arked ott trom their oontext, "they torm an essentially di.con-
tinuous system, end translate the prooess ot our peroeptual ex-
perience, whioh 18 naturally a flux, into a .et ot stagnant and 
petritied term •• "bl 
A third property ot oonception deals with a peculiar element 
Dr thought--the senae ot meaning. The meaning of a conoeption 
does not oonsist in the iaolated meaning of one word, the nucleus 
S'9Ibld" 462. 
60Ib1d., 461. 
-
61Ib1d., 467-468. 
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or kernel. It has to do with every word expressing the entire con-
ception, and each word must be consider,ed with all its fringed re-
latlons.62 Thus, when the word man1sused in two different sen-
- , 
tence., two entirely ditterent things mar be meant. When the sen-
tence reters to an individual, as ftWhiit:;~ wondertul man Jones isJ It, 
, '. 
all otherlndlyldual men are exclu~e2U:,:;7~;;iovever. when the sentenoe, 
;",'i.:'; ", 
Is, "What .. wondert'ul thing Man ist", thare i8 no such exclusion. 
The reason t'or this exolusion and 1nolus10n is to be t'ound in the 
fringe ot the word man. The fringed relations ot this conception, 
man. mar apply to all men, to sOlie men, or to one man, dependlng on 
~
wbat part ot the 1"rlnge is admi tied into the ,ense at meaning of 
the word !!n in a partioular context. This fringe i. an added con-
soiousness to the merenuoleus ot the word man. It "is an abao-
-
r,tutel,. positiy. sort at teeling, tItanlltorming what would otherwise 
~e mere noise or vislon into something understood; and determining 
the seq\lel ot IIY' thinking, the later vdrds and images, in a per-
tectly defin1te wa1.n63 The presence ot the frlnge is an integral 
part of the mind's Object and leads us to universals and to ab-
~tract 1deas. 
James began his di8cusslon ot abstract ideas with a rajec-
~ion of Berkeley'. nominalistic position. He olaimed that man'a 
~ommon mental experience ot abstract ideas argued decisively 
62Jam •• , PSlcnoloSl. p. ~o. at a180 aboye pp. 20-23. 
63101d., 241. 
against Berkeley. James allgned himself with the conceptualistic 
doctrine ot John Stuart Ml11, though he was not in entire agreemen1 
with it. An abstract idea, according toMl11, does not arise from 
the abstraction of one attribute trom others, but from attention 
fIx.ed .on one attribute to the exolusion'.t others. Thus, .there aPt . 
, , ,','}. 
" 
no general concepts, properly speald.n~,ibut on17 complex conoept. 
:'", <:!;,~. < ;~: 
ot objeots in the concrete. Throughoorieentration of attention, 
man is able to oonoeive certain concepts as if theY' were separated 
from the rest. James emphasized thIs latter notion that "'~hi1e 
!a!" ooncentration .2t attention lasts. !!. 11 !!. suffioientl! in ... 
tt,eBse, !!!. mal !!.!. temporarll1 unoonsoious .9!. anI ~ 1h! other attri-
butes, .!!!S! mal really, ill..!. briet interval, h!.!.! no thins; present 
12. .2!!.t ~ ~ !h!. attributes o<?J1stltuent .2!. !h!. cOl'lcep~.1 ••• 
If there be 8. better desoription extant," James added, "ot' a mind 
1n pOlses.lon of an 'abstract idea,' than i8 containodin the word • 
. . . 
I have italicized, I am unacquainted wIth. it.,,64 
Though James sided with the oonceptualists, he could not go 
along with the entire doctrine or Mill. He rejected Mill's notion 
"that a thought must ~t what it means. and mean what it is, and 
that it it be a picture of an entire individual, it cannot mean anJ 
part of him to the exolusion of the rest."65 James's rejection ot 
this doctrine is based on his distinction between the total obJeot 
64Jame8, Principles I, 470. 
6SIb1d., 471. 
-
lJ 
ot thought and the topic, or kernel, or n~oleusj ot the thought. 
The total object oonsists at eaoh word expressing the entire 
thought together with its fringed relatione, whereas the topic ot 
66 thought is the main subject of the entire disoourse. 
When applIed to abstract ideas, Jamests notions of the fringe 
and the topic ot thought take on added importance. James conten-
ded "that the Image Earl' .!!., the nucleus, is functionally the least 
important part of the thought." 6 7 'rhe important part is the 
entire context ot the thought, which includes the fringed rela-
tions. These fringes are tendencies leading us back to the origi-
nal context of the thought in the stream ot consciousness. There. 
tore: 
all that a state ot mind need do, in order to take cog-
nizance ot a reality. intend it. or be • about' it, i. 
to lead to a remoter state otm,ind which either acts 
upon the reality or resembles it. The only class ot 
thoughts whioh can with an,. show:. or plausibility be 8aid 
to resemble their objects are •• ~ations. The sturf et 
whioh all Our "other thoughts are 60mposed is symbolio, 
and a thought attests its pertinency to a topio b7 simp. 
17 terminating, sooner or later, Ina seneatlon vIhicb 
resemoles the latter. 68 
Thus, when oonoentrated attention singles a oonception out ot 
the stream ot consoiousness, this oonception is an abstraot idea, 
but it does not haTe to be an exaot duplioate ot what it knows. 
It 1s sufficient it that oonception leads the knower to an expel". 
66Ibid. Ct. also above, pp. 
-
67Ibid., 472. 
-
68Ibid., 471. 
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ienoe that ~ese.bles the first expe~ienoe from whioh it was taken. 
So James deoided, with reseryatiOD, in favor ot the oonceptualist's 
position on abstraot idea. and attirmed "that the power to think 
things, qualities, relations, or whatever other elements there mar 
be, isolated and abstraoted from the total experienoe in whioh ther 
appear, is the most indisputable funotion of our thought.,,69 
An abstraot idea was generally thought to be a universal, but, 
tor James, an abstract idea is neither uriivereal nor particular. 
Betore it is applied to an ind1v1dual or to a olass ot objeots, it 
is nothing but ft. 'that,' a 'tloating adjeotive.' •• ". Properlf 
it 18, in thi. state, a singular--I haYe .sing1ed it out •• ,,70 
When the abstraot oonoept 1s applied to a olass, there is a new 
oonoeption--that ot applying. The new oonception has nothing to do 
with any ehange, however, in the topic or nuoleu. of the thought, 
but 801elr with the vague oonsoiou.ne~s that surrounds the nuol.~s. 
James telt he had disoussed this vague"oonsciousness lutticient17 
when he analrzed the fringe and the topio ot thought. Th.s a uni-
versal ariaes when the mind spreads its attention out trom the nu. 
olauB ot the thought to the fringed relations. It these relationa 
are considered as they atfeot an ent1re class, the conception 1. 
universal. It the relation is confined to one individual, the 
conception is particular. To distingu1sh abstraot and universal 
69!!!g., 412-413. 
70Ibid •• 473. 
-
ideas we might use the examples ot a sphere. The exact center ot 
the sphere, prescinded from every other part, is the abstract. 
When attention reaches out to the rad!i going trom the center to 
the surtace of the sphere, the abstract idea beoomes universal it 
all the radi! are considered, or partioular it only one radIus is 
a t tended to •. 71 
In disoussing universals, James rejeoted both nominalism and 
oonoeptualism. He found. it "impossible to tell, in all the whirl 
about universal and particular, when the author is talking about 
universals 1n the mind, and when about objective universals, 80 
strangely are the two mixed together."72 James's reaction to the 
whole oontroversy waa that "this is nonsense. An idea neither 1. 
what it knows, nor knows what it is} nor will swarms of oopies ot 
the same tldea,t recurring In stereotyped form, or 'by the lrresla-
table laws ot assooiation tormed Into~one idea,' ever be the same 
-, 
th1ng al a thought ot '!!l!h! Eo.s~ble member,' of a 01&88."13 
James looked tor an explanation of the universal 1n hi. ana17-
sla ot consciousness. He found h1s explanation in the fringe, as 
we expla1ned on the preoeding page. James admitted, however, that, 
If the •• "swarms," postulated br the nominalists, could be trans-
lated into oerebral terms and thus made to stand for something 
71Ibld. 
-
72rbid,. 475. 
-
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real, this opinion would be less hollow than the conceptualist 
opinion. He thought this translation could take place "if each 
'idea' stands top some special nasoent nerve-ppocess, then the ag-
gregate ot these nascent processes might have for its consoious 
oorrelate a psychic 'fringe,' whioh should be just that universal 
meaning, or intention that the name or mental pioture employed 
should mean all the possible individuals of the 01&88."74 
James felt, however, that the whole oontroversy was an insig-
nificant detail in the taoe ot the tact that the mind works with 
universals, no matter what they may be. He oonoluded that "our 
meanings are ot singulars, partioulars, IndetlnltesJ and universal. 
mixed together in every way. A sin~ular individual i. as much 
conceived when he is isolated and identified away trom the rest ot 
the world in my mind, a. is the most rarefied and universally ap-
plioable quality he may possess--beine. tor example, when treated 
in the same vaT- tt7S The only value of "universals, thereto;., 1s 
that they help us to know new truths about individual things, and 
"the traditional universal-worship can only be called a bit ot 
pervers. sentl11entalism, a philosoph.ic 'ld.ol ot the cave.' "76 
Once he had resolved for himself the problema ot abstract and 
universal ideas, James turned to a discussion ot the purpose ot 
74Ihid. 
--.. 
1SIbid. t 479. 
761bid., 480. 
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conception. He began by restating the second oharacteristio anal-
yzed from consciousness: "nothing ~ ~ conceived tw1c~ ~ ~­
~ being conceived is entirelI different states ~ ~."77 Jame. 
held that the essence of conception is that a second thought i. re-
identified as the same as a previous thought in the stream of con-
sciousness. When an object i8 oonceived twice or more times, how-
ever, the notion of "twioe," or "more times," is an added note. 
"As a matter ot taot, the thoughts by which we know that we mean 
the same thing are apt to be very ditterent indeed trom each other, 
We think the thing now in one context, now in another; now in a 
definite image, now in a symbol. Sometimes our sense or its iden-
tity pertains to the mere fringe, sometimes it involves the nucleul~ 
ot our thought. n78 Thus, beeause the mind 1s constantly in dif-
terent states--growing and evolving with knowledge it constantly 
reeeiyes,--eaeh new conception ot the:. same object 113 a little dif-
terent than the previous oonception. 
In this notion ot the evaluation of thought, J~~es has two 
seemingly contradictory elements. He speaks of conception as de-
pending on sameness, yet he states that two conceptions can never 
be the same. He resolves this problem by distinguishing the es-
a.noe and the purpose ot conception. 
Though the essence of conception oonsists in the continuity 
77ill!!. 
78Ibid. 
-
)8 
and permanency ot the topic ot a thought, the purpose ot conceptloD 
oomes trom the mlnd's operatlng on the thought. The mind alters, 
ImproYes, and substltutes one pred1cate tor another without eyer 
lettlng the subject change. "This," James remarks, "is wbat 1s 
lIIeant when it is sald that thinklng consists In making j\1dgmenta."7~ 
In makina judgments all sorts ot new reaulta are brought out. The 
entire process might be reduced to mereI1 haYing the topic, then 
operating on it through judgment., and tinal11 haying It again in 
a richer and truer wa1- ~U8, In the end "a compound conception 
bas been substituted tor the Simple one, but wlth full oonscious-
ness that both are ot the 5 .. e."80 
This enrichment ot the conoept comes trom the fact that con-
sciousness and the mind are alva18 changing and .Yolving. When 
the mind operates on the data given to sense, It transtorms the 
order In which experlence comes into ~ entlrely dltter.nt order, 
that of the conc.ived world. Jame. contrasted the conceptual or-
der to a ale.e in,whioh a man trIes to gather up tbe world" con-
tents, how .... ert 
Moat tacts and relations tall through its meshes, being 
ei ther too subtle or insignificant to b e tlxed in &D1 
conception. But whenever a phYSical reality 1s caught 
and identitled as the same with something already oon-
eel ... ed, it remains on the slev., and all the predicate. 
and relations ot the oonoeption with whioh it is iden-
titied beoome its predicates and relations toO) it is 
subjected to the sieve'. n.tnrorlt , in other words. 
79!!!!., 481. 
801D1d• 
-
Thus oomes to pass what Hr. Hodgson oalls the trans-
lation of the perceptual into the oonoeptual order ot 
the world. 51 
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This notion ot transformation led James to consider the ulti-
mate purpose of conception. Conception "is really nothing but a 
teleological instrument. Ie!! whole tunction !! conceiyins, ~ 
fixing, !nS boldin, taat ~ meanina., S!! S! .1sn1ticange tRart 
~ !h! !!2! ~ !!! conceiver !! ~ oreature ~ ~art1al pur-
. poses ~ private end,.ft82 
fhi. teleological notion ot Jamel aanbe found in hi. earliest 
writings. In an article, publi.h.d 1n 1879. be .&71 that the 
quest in philoaopbJ 1s a .earoh tor a conoeption. Thi. he desori-
bed a. fta teleolGsieal instrument. It is a partial aspeot ot a 
thing which tor £St purpo.e we regard as ita .s •• ntial aspeot, a. 
the representative ot the entire thing. • • • the •••• nc., the 
ground ot oonc.ption. varies with the" end we have in view. ft8J 
Jamea adopt.d thia teleologIcal aapeot, this dependence of ooncep-
tlon on the will of the knower, because "no ooncept can be a val-
id aubatitate for a concrete reallt7 except with reterence to a 
partioular intereat in the conoeiver. ••• The only virtue • • • 
oonoeption need have is simplicity, and a 8imple conception i. an 
equival.nt tor the world on17 so tar a. the world is aimple, the 
81Ibld., 482. 
82Ibid • 
......... 
8JWI11Iam Jame., "The SentIment ot Rationalit7." Colleoted 
E,aals ~ ReYiew., edt Ralph Barton Perry (New York, t9~o), p. 86. 
world meanwhile, whatever simplicity it may harbour, being a180 a 
mightily complex attalr. ft84 
James developed the idea ot conception as teleological when 
be discusled it as a part ot the reasoning process. Reasoning, top 
Jame., wal the substitution ot abstraot properties tor a concrete 
obSect. Conception gives us these properties} thereby it beoomel 
part ot the process. 
In conception on11 one out ot many possible properties of an 
objeot i8 singled out and attended to. Since the object has ma~ 
properties, anyone of these could be conceived; but whichever 
property is singled out i8 just as true as anr that baa been ne-
glected. James concluded, therefore, that "all ways of conceiving 
a concrete tact, it they are true ways at all, are equallJ true 
ways. There 11 E2 eroperty ABSOLUTELY essential ~ anI ~ thing.ft)5 
Therefore, there is no injustice in attributing only one property 
• 
to an object to the exclusion ot others. Moreover, there il an 
excuse tor thia mode ot conceiving: "My excuse i8 necessity-.the 
neoessity whioh my tinite and praotica1 nature 1a71 on me. My 
thinking 18 tirst and laat and always tor the lake of my doing, 
and loan do only one thing at a tIme. fte6 
James admitted that this notIon ot practIcality was aga1nst 
84Ib1d •• 123. 
851b1d, 
86James , Principles. II, 333. 
the common-sense and acholastic notions, which contend that tbere 
ls one thing absolutel,. proper to an object--its essence. But 
James Insisted that ~~ onil meanins g! essence !! teleolosical, 
~ ~ clas.itication ~ conception ~ purell teleological 
weapons ~ !S!~. !!! elsence ot a thing is that one ot its 
properties which is eo important !2t ~ Interests that in compari-
son with It I ma,. neglect the rest. n87 
In an article, ~Retles Action and Theism," written in 1881, 
James discussed what he meant b,. conception being an Instrument 
tor private ends. Hind 1s committed to be a teleological mechan-
ism, he thought, because ot the retlex theory ot action. This 
theorr means: 
that the acts we pertorm are alwa7sthe result ot out-
ward discharges trom the nervous centres, and that these 
outward discharges are themselTes the result ot impres-
sions trom the external world, carried in along one or 
another ot our sensor,. nerves •• ~ •• The structural unit 
ot the nervous srstem is in tact· a triad, neither ot " 
whose elements has any independent existence. The 8en-
sorr impression exist. onl,. tor the sake ot awaking the 
central process ot reflection, and the central prooess 
ot retlection exists only tor the sake ot calling torth 
the tinal act. All action is thus re-action upon the 
outer world) and the mid.le stage or-consideration or 
contemplation or thinking i8 only a place ot transit, 
the bottom ot the loop, both ot whose engft haTe their 
polnt ot application in the outer world. 
Thus, the thInking tacult7 "tunctious exclusivell ~ !a! A!!! 2! 
~nds that do not exist at all 1n the world ot impressions • , • 
87Ibid., 335. 
-
88WI11iam James. "Retlex Action and ThelsM," Essals on Paith 
~ Morals, ed. Ralph Barton Perry (New York, 1947'. pp. II3-f14. 
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but are aet by our emotional and practical subjectivity alto-
gether. n89 The thinking t"acult7 t:ranstol'ms the data received .trom 
the seDSe world into a conceiTed order, and the transformation i. 
affected by the interests ot mants volitional nature. 
James waa torced to call on manta volitional nature to direct 
the transformation of' the perceived world into the conceived world, 
because he thought that man had "no organ or facult,. to appreciate 
the simply given order."90 Since man cannot appreciate the g1ven 
order, he must break its complexity and multiplicity into parts 
and remodel it in his mind. That this 1s the proper way ot handling 
the given order is "the miracle ot m:1racles, a miracle not yet 
exhaustive11 cleared up by any philosophy, ~ ~ • tbat the given 
order lends itselt to remodeling."91 
There was, Jame. thought, an ~lement in all things that was 
beyond the reach ot man" mind. Sine, man has to deal with all 
things, there must be some way, besides the time, .to remodel the 
given order. Another faculty must be called in to direct the re-
modeling. This faculty is the will. JameS considered this the 
higher taculty, and through its response to the nature ot things 
man has the best communication he oan bave with the world. There-
tore, man's cognitive taculty is subordinated to his volitional 
89~ •• 115. 
90Ib1d., 118. 
-
91Ibld., 119. 
-
taoult,._ James summarized his ideas with the thought that "in 
ever7 being that is real there is something external to, and sacred 
t~om, the grasp ot everr other. God's being is saored trom ours, 
To co-operate with his creation by thee b$st and rightest response 
seems all he wants ot us. In such co-operation with his purpose • 
• • • must lie the real meaning otourtie'stin,..n92 
In this chapter we have discussedJ..:mests psychological no-
tion ot concept. To see the concept in proper perspective, it was 
necessary to dlscuss the stream otconsciouaness trom whiQh the 
concept arises and ot whose elements the concept partakes. Throu~ 
a discusslon ot the charaoteristics, properties, and teleological 
valu. and purpose ot the concept, we have arrived at the tull. 
blown notion ot concept whioh James had eT01Ted when he tinished 
the Prinoiples in 1890. There were problems, however, which had 
sprung up dl.tt'ing the wri tins ot the !X~~Cip1e8 and which James put 
aside until he could think them tbrougi'more thoro.ghly. Now we 
must consider the philosoph,. he d.eTlsed as an explanation ot and 
solution to the.e problems. 
92Ibid., 141. 
CHAPTER III 
RADICAL EMPIRICISM: A SOLU¥Id.J~~ SOME PROBLEMS 
,:~:;:,t!~, ",' ," .. ::/ ;:;'~~;;}~;f 
When James tinished the princ!~l~iI':~,lhe felt he had presented 
the tacts and data ot mental lite ~~d';i~;jlYit1'. Howeyer, the 
" ' ~;}, _1" ;: :': ";," :)~:.( '~~": ~'~~: 
lem of how knowledge was possible 'p!;;j;~,still concerned him. He 
~if\:., .;!: .. "~ . ",\' 
knew tromhisstudies and experlmei~.:ji.t men know, but he did 
not know how two and known, could 
be joined 1n the 
A .econd problem James considj'~~:,""8 concerned wi th 
ceptual and :O'nCeptual wO'r1ds. A1j~fl~>~~d ot the last chapter we 
saw that he held that the tunctionot the cognitive faou1ty is to' 
remodel the world presented to it by the' aenaea. This function 
was, primarll7, the task ot transfor.l~ the perceptual world intO' 
~ 
the conceptual, under the guidanoe O't the volitional tacu1ty, in 
crder to' giye man a plan of action in the world. James attributed 
to conoeption both a meaning and a content. The meaning, having 
to do with the fringe of the object, went belond the content. Her 
was the problem: How CQuld a oonception terminate in an ettect 
lWilliam Jamea,PslchQloR, ed. Ralph Barton Perr7 (CleTeland, 
1948), p. 462. 
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that waa gre.ter than Its cause?2 
James. also, sought a means ot reconolllng the contradlctory 
oharacterlstics he analysed in the concept and In the atream trom 
which It arose, These contradictory elements were dlscretene.s 
and oontlnuit7, unchangeableness and changeableness, the selt-sut-
ticiency ot sensation and the inadequacy ot concwption, 
James recognized these problems as belonging to metaphyslca. 
Psychology had taken him as tar as it could. He considered it to 
be "particularly tragile, and Into whlch the waters ot metaphysi. 
cal criticism leak. at every jolnt, a psychology allot whoae ele-
mentary assumptions and data must be reoonsidered In wider connec-
tions and tranalated into other terms,_3 After writing the !t!!-
ciplea he telt tree to take up the proylsional philosophlcal doc-
trine he had held In reserve tor man, years. 
James Itated the nature and purp9se that he thought a phlloao-
phJ .hould have in an address, "The Se4tlmeut ot RationalIty," 
given in 1819. Man'. rational nature, he contended, seeks rest , 
and peace in an harmonious unity ot the diverse elements ot the 
world. The philosophic need, theretor., 18 to bring the sensible 
diveraity ot the world into a unlty, while, at the aame time, pre-
serving the clearness ot the diverse elements considered separatel, 
This will be accomplIshed when man reaches a unity in diveraity. 
2:rbld., 465. 
3Ibld., 467. 
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when the parts tit together into an intrinsic achematio whole. 
"The entire process ot philosophic simplification ot the chaos con-
slsts ot two acts, Identification and Association. Both are prln-
aiples ot union and theoretic rationality; but the rationality be-
tween things associated 1s outward and oustom-bred. On1~ when 
things are identified do we pass inwardly and necessarily trom one 
to the other. "4 
James proposed two steps toward unitying the chaos. The tirst 
step is to classlty the items ot the chaos. This is done by con-
centration ot a concept10n on a particular attribute ot a thing. 
When a certain attribute is picked out in this way, "we literally 
and strictly identity it 1a ~ respect with the other concretes 
ot the class having that attribute tor its essence."5 
Tbe second step in the unitication of the chaos 1s the associ. 
atioD ot class attributes among themselves. This is achieved when 
the oonnection betwe.n certain class-concepts and certain determin-
ed consequences is established.6 The co~~eotions between things 
only becomes establisbed, bowaTer, "when, by suoceasive substitu-
tions of essencea tor thIngs, and highe~ for lower essenoes, we 
sucoeed in reaching a point ot view trom whioh we can vIew tbe 
says 
4William Jame., "The Sentiment ot Rationality," Collected Ea. 
and Reyi.wa, ed. Ralph Barton Perry (New York, 1~~11), p. lOT. _ ............................. ' 
"Ibid., 102. 
"Ibid., 105. 
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things as one."7 
Thus, tl'om this statement of' the purpose ot philosophy, Jam •• 
thought it eyident that "our idea of the univel'sa cannot assume an 
inwardly l'ational shape until each separate phenomenon 1s conoeiye. 
1 
as tundamentally identioal with eyer,. other. He This was his vay 
ot stating his seapch tor an intrinsI0 unitying element 1n things. 
He did not uant an external tramework, nol' even a 10g1cal one it 
it were not Intl'insic to things themselves. 
Among the elements to be bl'ought into unity were those ot the 
perceptual and conceptual worlds. Betore we will be able, howeyer, 
to show how lames claimed to unity these almost contl'adictory 
worlds, we must discuss, at some length, th8 unifying prinoiple 
that he derived f'or all things, acoording to his philsophioal id.a.~ 
For eight 7e&1'S atter the Principles had been published Jame. 
worked OYel' his tentative philosophioal system. James called hi. 
general attitude in philosophy that ot "radical empiricism, and the 
basic, unifying element to be tound in all things he called ·pure 
experience." In 1898, while ;ecomlng mo~e conYinoed that his phil-
osophy ot pure expel'ience might be the lolQtton he was seeking, 
James wrote that "the whole B!! ot the tchange ot basel ,to pure ex-
perience is to see whetber one may thereby solve certain problems 
whioh are stickers on the usual dualistio categories, e.g.: ••• 
7Ib1d., 108. 
8Ib1d., 109. 
-
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(5) The peroeptual and conceptual world ••.••• Could the taots 
that enter lnto these problems be smooth.ty tormulated without para-
. dox or con;radiction on the basis of tlle":;pure experience or pure-
phenomenon hypothasls, then the latterllduld certainly 8core a 
great triumph. n9 
While James was ~orumlat1ng hls philosophy, he rejected man1 
ot the ass~tions he had made in writing hi. Princ1Eles. Among 
the questioned assumpt10ns was that of the primacy he had attribu-
ted to oonsciousness. At the end of bis PSloholoSl, he wrote that 
"it seems as if consciousness 8S an inner act1v1ty were rather a 
10 Rostula~e than a sensibly given fact." In 1904, therefore, 1n 
an article entitled "Does Oonsciousness Exist?" James made a tormal 
statement of his new position that there is onl,. "one primal stuff 
or material in the world, a stuff ot whioh everything is composed, 
and it we oall that stutf 'pure exper~enee.t then knowing oan ea-
11 
si11 be explained." " . 
In this study of the broad outlines ot James's philosophy or 
pure experienoe, the three diYisions established by Ralph Barton 
Perry will b e rolloved. The first stage or James t s development, 
9Ralph Barton Perry. The Thosght and Oharacter ot William 
James (Boston, 193$), II, ~-j69. '0;-& comple!e pICture of 
Jamea's p~oblems in formulating pure experience, ott William James, 
~ Pluralistic Universe, edt Ralpb Barton Perr7 (New York, 1943), pp. ~65-!1j. 
10Jame., P8ICbololJ, p. ~7. 
llWilliam James, Eseals in Radioal Empiricism, edt Ralph Bar-
ton Perl',. (New York, 1943', p:-4. 
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according to P.rr~, is the psychological stage. This phase con-
sists in the enrichment o~ the conception ot experience in order 
that it may be competent to embrace the structures and activities 
of knowledge. ThE! second phase is to bring withln experience the 
distinction between mind and body. This demands that experience 
be "neutralized," treed from exclusive association with conscious-
ness so that it may embrace the physical world as well. The third 
and last step in Jamests development is to identify this new con-
. 12 
ception ot experience with the metaphysical reality. Each ot 
these three phases will be discussed in turn in order that the sa-
lient features ot James's philosophy may be seen. 
James's initial formulation of his philosophy consisted in 
the enrichment ot experience. This enrichment took place in his 
analysis ot consciousness whioh was discussed in the previous chap-
ter. However, there are three philosophically significant ideas 
that should be stressed. 
The tirst of these ideas is that ot the tranal t1.ve states ot 
consciousness. Despite the o~sourit1 of these states, James de~ 
clared that they were actually present to the sensitive and prac-
tised eye of an introspectionist. There importance is that "they 
quality their ~ermini--both the has-just-been and the soon·about-
to_be. n13 The philosophical importance ot these states is that 
l2aalph Bar~on Perry, 1a ~ Spirit 2! William James (New 
Haven, 1938), pp. 76-77. 
lJlbid., 82. 
-
50 
they give "veritiable meaning to concepts which had hitherto b.en 
abstract and verbal."14 
Perry considers Jamests Insistence on the validlty ot the 
transitive states an example ot James's ettorts "to carryall the 
terms ot discourse back to the orlglnal data ot sense."lS Jamea, 
In thi. ettort, thought the term "teelingft would best express what 
be deslred, It it was treed trom its as.ociatlon wlth attective or 
emotional stat... Thls teeling would be, James thought, "the appre~ 
henslon ot the in-it.eltne.s ot so.e root character, di.cr1mlaabl. 
trom all others, requiring a name ot its own, and .voking the co .. 
ment, II see what it i8,' trom minda pos.es.ed ot the appropriate 
sensibilitie. and dIrected to the rlght context. w16 
James t , second important idea in this psychological atage ot 
the development ot his philosophr is that he gave e.pirical mean-
ing to the relation ot subject and ob4ect. Phi1osopber. ot James'. 
" 
time thought that there was no common ground ot whlch both subject 
and object partook. James reduced the subject to veritiable ter •• 
Dr cODsidering per.onal identIt, a. "the experience that 'make. a 
man be ai •• elt to himselt.,n17 With the subject put back into ex-
perience along wlth the object, the relatlonship between them no 
141bid• 
-
lSIbld _. 
161b1cl., 83. 
171bi4., 86. 
-
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longer bad to be assumed or postulated. It could be tound in a 
common experience. James telt that it abstracted elements, sucb 
as subject, were restored to their original experience, be would 
tind these elements embedded in a matrix of original relationships. 
Then there would be no need ot postulating some artifioial trame. 
work to explain these re1ationshiPs.18 
The third important teature or Jame.'s psychological sta,e is 
his reduction ot idea and objeot to the common terms ot experience. 
When the idea is of the perceptual world, it becomes oontluent witb 
experience. In ide.. ot the conoeptual world Jame. distinguished 
two objectivitie., one internal and one external. "fhe internal 
object is the experienoe ot reterence itselt •••• fhis objectiv-
ity gccurs, 1n the now-pre.ent experlence. n19 Besides thls pre-
'ent meaningfulne.s ot the concept, which consists in tendencie. 
ot the tringe, there is a180 an external element, the "meant." 
Thi. " .. ant" is the tuture experience .oward which the pre.ent oon-
cept i8 pointing and whioh will glve validity to the present oon-
cept when it is actuall, experienced. Perr, sa1s that these "ul-
terior .bjectlve .eaning which remain transcendent, becoae a set 
ot experiences differing not in any radical sense, but onlJ in 
their accidental inacoessibility_ As distant, bJpothetloal, or 
poasible experience •• the, are ot the aame nature, and lie in the 
18Ibid., 89. 
19Ib1d.,,90_ 
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same tield, as the present experience_ ft20 Th~s, through a retined 
ana17sis, James has reduoed ideas to the verT same field of experi-
ence as objects occuP7_ 
James cla1med that the ~ee ideas just discueased were only 
supplementations ot the data accessible through introspection. Wlt~ 
the caretul introspection James u.ed he enriched the content ot 
consoiousness. The three ideas just discussed were also the im-
portant one., philosophica11l, in that e~lchment. and ther mark 
the PSlchologieal stage ot his development. 
The second phase ot Jamests development os hi. philosophy ot 
experience Perry calls the "phenomenalistic phase. ft This phase 
is primaril7 "an analrais, a ~eduction ot the bodilr and mental 
worlds to the same or1ginal components. u21 To aobieve this reduo-
tion, James had to neutrali.e experienoe, to tree it trom its as-
sociation with consoiousness. The di,ous8ion ot this seoond pha •• 
will consiat ot tour points: (I) pure experience as a method, (2) 
a retine.ent ot the notion of oODsoiousness, () the neutrallzatio~ 
of experience, (4) Perry's analysis of this phase. 
Even atter Jamel reduced subject and idea to the field of ex-
perience, as was discussed aboYe, he st1ll assumed an ulterior 
physical reality whioh consciousness did not include. In his et-
tort to reconstruot the basic structures ot this reality and oon-
20Ibid., 91* . 
.......... 
21fb1d ., 97~ 
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sciousness so that the,. could be tounded in a more basic unitying 
reality. James assumed pure experience as a method. "~he princi-
ple ot pure experienoe," he writes, "is a180 a methodical postu-
late. • • • Everyth1ns real must be experienceable somewhere, and 
eyerT kind ot thing experienced must somewhere be r8al."22 In the 
pretace to his collection ot essays under the title ot I!! XeaniDl 
2£ Truth, James restates this principle and elaborates on it. He 
speaks here ot radical empiricism which is the general theory that 
protesses pure experienoe to be the basic reality. JAm.s then 
loes on to sar that 
radioal empiricI •• consists tirst of a postulate, next 
a statement ot tact, and tinally a generalized oonclu-
sion. 
The po.tulat. is that the onl,. things that shall 
be debatable among philosophers ahall be things detin~ 
able In.term. drawn trom experience •••• 
The statement ot tact 1s that the relations b .... 
tween things, conJunct1ve as well as disjunctive, are 
Just as auoh matter. or dtreot p~rtiou1ar experienoe, 
neither more so nor leiS 80. than ~he things them-
selves. 
Tb.e generalized oonolusion i.,that thel'Qtore the 
parts of experience hold togetber trom next to next 
b1 relations that are themselves parts ot experience. 23 
Arter James adopted pure experienoe as a methodioal postulate, 
he subjeoted oonsoiousness it •• lt to this empirical oriterior. 
Finding that "the ditterenoe between mind and body it.elt 1. an 
experienced ditterence, then it il clear that experienoe must be 
22Jame., Radioal Empiric! •• , p. 160. 
23William Jame., The Meanina ot Truth, ed. Ralph Barton Perr1 
(New York, 194.3). p. xrr: -
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assigned a me:re exteneled mea.ning than oon8010118ne88_"24 Thepetore, 
James adopted the word "pure 8%pv1ence," 80 that it would not be 
cont~sed with the experience of oonsciousness. Up to this time he 
bad Qsed the word consciousness and experience interchangeablr_ 
Now exper1ence was "a more inclus1ve manifold within wh1ch con-
soiousness itselt ••• wa.s distinguished and explained_"Z5 
This new meaning and limitation Qf consciousness enabled 
James to give explicit empirical interpretation to the dualitr be. 
tween the knowing mind and the external world. In the knower-
known relatIonship, the object has a cognitive objeot:vit1 within 
oonsciousness. It has also a. metaphrsical objactlvlt~, indepen~ 
dent ot its part in the knowledge relationship, "in the sense of 
belonging to another order than that mentalit7 into which, through 
being known, it is Introduoed. R26 Thus in knowledge the mind some-
how reaches beyond Itselt to anothep order. 
Once Jam.s bas, therefore, made experience more inclusive 
than consoiousness, he oan aooount tor this new obJeotivity "by 
oonoe1ving that the phJs1cal order and the mental order overla.p 
1n common phenomena or pure experlenoe. ft27 
Perry's analysis ot this second phase ot James's philosophy 
24Perry, In the Spirit ot William Jam ••• p. 93. 
2SIbid• 
26Ibid., 9S. 
-
21Ibid. 
-
1s that it is tentative and not clearly to~.ulated. He olal •• that 
the main prinoiple, however, "ls clear, name17. that both subjeo-
tivity in the mental sense and obJeotlvit7 In the phys10al sense 
are pat"t1cular modes of experience in the "pure" or "phenomenal" 
sense. n28 In this phase pllre experience has not been raised to the 
ultimate reality, it 1s a mere potentiality or a class name tor 
the ultImate reality. It must first be filled out and elaborated 
before it can become the cov~on element of all things. Perry con-
oludes that James, in this second phase. "introduoed pure experi-
ence as the abor1g1nal form ot being, embracIng consciousness, to-
gether with non-conscious or non-mental forms of being, suoh as 
bodles.,,29 
With experience so neutralized, at the end of this phenomenal-
istic .. tage of his philosQphi.cal development, that 1 t is the abor-
iginal to~ro or all things, J~~ea is r~ady to prooeed to his third 
and tinal phase, the metaphysical. In''this phase, James raises 
pure experienee to the ultimate metaphysioa1 real1ty_ The discus-
sion ot this third phase will oonsiet of three steps: (1) the idea-
tifioation of pure experience with the ultimate reality, (2) the 
tive oharaoteristios ot pure experience in this phas., (3) Perry'. 
analysis of Jamea'smetaphyslcs ot experience. 
In the first and second phases ot his phIlosophical develop-
28Ibld., 91. 
29IbId" 100. 
~.nt, James wideDed the notion ot experience b1 reduoing various 
~ealities to empirical11 veritiab1e terms. James had made it pos-
sible that mind and bod7, and all their modes ot exi.tence, Were 
experienceable realities. 'l'o tind the deeper teatures ot the.e 
~ealities, be turned to his analysis ot perceptual experience. "Th, 
deeper teatUres ot reality," he writes, "are tound onl,. in percep-
tual experienoe."30 
When James ana17zed perceptual experienoe, it was not the ob-
vious teatures he looked tor but the hidden meanlngs. Perr,. give. 
an example or this ana1,-sis ot,Jeeats thoughts on 11te. Jam •• 
wrltes that "there is someth!.ng in lite, '8 one tee19 its pre.ence, 
that seems to dety all the possible resourees or phraseology. • • 
Tbe living moments--8ome liylng moments, at an,. rate--nave aome-
what ot absolute flt0meth.ing ot the abaolut! that needs no lateral 
support. Their meaning seeMS to vell~up trom out ot their .ery 
centre, in a way impossible yerbally todescrib •• "31 Perry con-
siders these moments 8.S the moments ot integration when experlenoe 
becomes a selt-sustaining reallt,..32 
James himself writes ot his reality a8 coming in moment. or 
30william James, Some Problema of PhiloloPBl (New York, 1940). 
p.97. - - --
31Orlg1na1 paragraph whlch Jam.. wrote tor the opening ot the 
Gittord leotures .uDI.q.ent1~ published under the title, The VarI-
eties of R_litiOUI E!§erience, quoted bl Perr~, fhe fho~a~ 
Character of 1111am ames (Boston, 193$), II, 3~ ,~ iii 1n 
Sracket. would s.em to Se the author's meaning. 
32Per~, ~!e! Spirit g! William Jam •• , p. 103. 
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parts. He ears that "though one part of our experlenctlt may lean 
upon another part to make it what it is in anyone ot several as-
pects in which it m8J be considered, experience as a whole is selt. 
containing and leans on nothing_ttl) Thus, James identified pure 
experience with the ultimate metaphyaieal reality. 
Onoe he hRS shown how James id~ntlfied pure experience with 
basie reality, Perry begins to enumerate the characteristics which 
the deeper features ot pure experience will hnve. 
Belng Identified with experience, this realIty wf.ll have all 
the qualities of 8ensation--lmmediaey, diversity, vividness, and 
vltallt,. • .34 
The gradual untolding of the world through th~ught 1s a seo-
ond characteristic of th~s pure exper1enc~. Since thought is a 
seleotion dictated by somA personal interest, it is evident that 
the!'e is something greater than the selection. "To select is to 
select trom, which implies not only a ~&s1duum excluded trom the 
seleotion, but a togetherness ot the included and exoluded in the 
original Plenum*"l5 Since the plenum must be so constituted that 
the seleotion ls possible, it must be a f1eld of eligibility, and 
therefore, a world suitable to the exeroise ot treedom.36 
33James , Radioal Emei!'ioism, p. 193. Fo!' a complete view ot 
this IdentltlcatIon, cf. !ome Problems ot PhI1osophl, Chat X, XI 
and ~lurall.tlc Ul\i ... ,,;r,ut, -miS. VI, Vlf.-
34Perry, !n!h!. S21rit s.r. William James, p. 10,3. 
35Ibld., 104. 
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The third characterist1c or experienoe is the effort to re-
const1tute the undivided rield ot choice. By being aware ot the 
interests that prompted the selection from the ~len~~ in the Seo-
ond stage, the metaphysician can reconstruct this original plenum. 
Each act ot selection is an enriohment of t~e conorete immediacy 
ot experience, but atter analysis the ~ind is able to apprehend 
a greater Tolume of the original experience. "~he aim ot ~eta­
physics 1s to profit by seleetiye attention so that the ditferen-
tiated features may be embodied in a more adequate and inolusive 
synthe~ls."37 
A fourth characteristic, olosely related to the third, 1s the 
originality ot reality_ From an analysis or selection we become 
aware of the oriGinal plenum. Thus analYZed, James t s llorld 1s 
"e. selection i~1 the making, amidst a superabundance ot the unse-
lected. n38 This world of James exoluqes nothing and includes ev.r,~ 
thing experienceable. Perry writes that ffhis universe is a uni-
Terse by Tlrtue of its omitting nothing, bj virtue of its indeter-
minate immenSity and oomplexity. its unanalyzed ingredients, its 
unplumbed depths, its passage beyond every horizon, and not by 
T1rtue ot any architeoture, or structural delimitat1on, whether 
logical, aesthetio, or moral."39 
37Ibid., 105-106. 
-
38Ib1d., 108. 
-
39Ibid., 101. 
Continuity is the fitth and tinal characterlstia of James's 
world ot pure experienoe. James saw the problem of continuity as 
a phase of the problem of the one and the many. In some way the 
unity ot continu1t7 had to be reoonoiled with the plurality ot dis. 
creteness. In other words, how can the discrete moments of exper-
ienoe be reoonciled with the general tlow ot the stream ot experi-
ence? James proposed to solve this probleM "by the notion ot a 
manitold or overlapping partioulars. In its tCr1?oral applioation 
this ~eans that STory moment is both retrospeotive L,d prospeotiTe 
as well as presant. n40 Eaoh moment, theref.ore, oontains, in some 
way, the elements 0:' t::·very other mO'Jlent 1n the stream ot experienct Ito 
Eaoh moment or this ex~erienoa contains both what it has inherited 
trom the past and what it needs to push onward toward the tuture. 
!he p:roblem ot the perceptual and conceptual worlds 1s a par-
ticular application ot this problem ot continuity, since the par-
ceptual world 18 contInuous and the conceptual is disorete. Parr,. 
says that a theory ot knoi>V'ledge can dtstlr.guish between tho con-
cept as an instrument and the reality to 'Hh1ch 1 t applies.. "Meta. 
phy'sics, on tho other hand;, -:rJust bring them into the same world. 
The comparatIve unroality of ooncepts must somehow be reconciled 
with the tact that there are ooncepts."41 Ja=es'a problem was 
........ ;;;;,;;;,.. ... -
that ot giving validity to oonception after he said that percep-
40Ib1d., lOq. 
-
411b14., 110. 
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tua1 knowledge reveals experienee. He inoreased th3 difficulty ot 
his problem by admitting that concepts have a certain objectivity 
ot their own. 
Jamests solution to this problem is a suggestion rather than 
an elaborated explanation, says Perry. "The essence of it 11es in 
regarding conoepts as abstractions, outs, excerpts, taken from the 
plenum ot reality by an interested act of seleotion. They present 
renlity in some partial aspect suitable to action ••• or serve 
as a substitute tor th3 fullor experience when it is unattaln-
able. ft42 When attentive selection foouses on a partial aspeot ot 
n reality, there is a conoept. It is only separated in the sense 
that it Is d1stingulsed tram its context, but its oontext 1s none 
the less there. It is not separated in Cm ontological sense. Thus 
concepts are real tor they are part ot t~e stream of exper1ence, 
!'but they are unreal lmen taken by themselves as partial views ot 
realitj.4.3 
James r~artirmed the 'ValIdity of conco;>tlo:::1, also, In admit-
ting fixed meanings. When a part of experience is selected tronl 
the stream, it is divested ot its changeable oharacteristics and 
it is seon an :f"lxed and eternal. The tl"ue reality ot this part or 
experience, however, is round only in the continuity ot the .tream.~ 
42Ibid., 110-111. 
4J1b1d .. , 111. 
-
44Ibid., 112. 
-
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'erry summarizes Jame.'. philosophy when he write. that "1n 
its tinite and synthet1c concreteneaa, it e.cape. the paradoxes 
which beset ab.tract infinity. Its overlapping and interpenetra-
tion ot parts illuminate the mystery o~ identity and ditterence. 
Thus, the world or appearance not only loses those characters ot 
inadequaoy which have incited rationalistic metaphysics to its 
dialectioal quest, but pro.es it.elt to be a potent solYent ot an-
cient problems."45 
The main line. ot James's philosophioal deYelopment, througb 
the three phases outlined by Perry, bave been the .ubject ot our 
discussion thus tar in tbi. chapter. Now, it is nece.sary to turn 
to anotber development, akin to that ot philosophy, whioh had im-
portance in Jame.'s notion ot concept. This is his development ot 
pragmatism. We will attempt to .how the importance and relation 
ot pragmatism to radical empiricism bl examining the roots ot 
these two developments. Then, there will be a briet statement ot 
James'a theory ot meaning and ot truth. 
Jamea's pragmatism and radical empirici •• developed together 
both in hi. mature thought and in his writing •• 46 The relation-
ship between tbe.e two streams ot development were important tor 
James considered that "the establishment ot the pragmatist theory 
45Perry, !hought ~ Character, I, 461. 
46A study or the Annotated Bibliosra1bl ot the Writinss ot William Jam •• by Perry, shovs that tbe ma n bOdy-ot ~amest. phIlo-
sophlcal wrIting took place in 1904-1906, vhereas his pragmatism 
vas elaborated on trom 1901-1908. 
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ot truth 1s a step ot f1rst-rate 1mportanoe in making radical e.-
pirieia. prevail. M47 Through the application ot pragmatism to the 
problems ot the conceptual world James hoped to reduce conception 
to the world ot experience by explaining the meanlng and truth ot 
concepts in experiential terms. Perry suggests two connectlons be-
tween Jame.'s philosophy and his pragmatism: 
First. the torme. is an applioation ot the latter: the 
pragmatio method and standard ot truth are repeatedly 
applied to the proot ot pluralism and the dlsproot ot 
monis.. Second, the latter is applied to the tormer: 
that ls, the pragmatio aocount ot knowledge aftords a 
special case ot the plural1stio .etaphysics_ • _ • 
Pragmatis. does not merely provide a method whicb can 
be employed 1n .etaphys1cs--it provides a metaphysics 
ot truthwb1cb is consistent with that general meta-
physics which James advocate., through bringing the 
entire procgss ot cognition within the tield ot possible 
experienoe. 
,. 
A brier glance at the origins ot pragmatism wl1l tind traces 
ot it in Jamests earliest writings. James himselt traced his 
earliest tormulations ot pragmatism to., an address given in',188S, 
"On the Function ot Cognit10n."49 He tormally declared his prag-
matism 1n an address given in 1898, "Philosophical Conceptions and 
Pract1cal Results." Perry traces James.s pragmat1sm to articles 
written in the 1870's where James .tressed the teleological aspeat 
ot knowledge. In an article entitled, "Th. De.elopment or Jam.s's 
47James, !eanig .2! 'fruth, p_ xii. 
48perrJ, Tboulb~ and Character, II, 
490t• Mean1~ ot Tru.th, pp. 41-42. 
explicit 1ft hI. ~dre.s whIch w.re later Here J"es lists the 1deas developed in his PralUll&t1s;11. 
r 
63 
Pragmatism Prior to 1879," Maurice Baum claimed that it his evi-
dence and conclusions are sound, "James was a pragmatist betore he 
wrote his '.lcho1081, and he had attained prior to 1879 a concep-
tion ot pragmatism both as a method and aa a theory ot truth which 
wa. complete in all essential respects.-50 Saum proves his thesis 
by citing passages in James's ear11er writings which are similar, 
almost verbatim at timea, to the main characteristics ot James's 
later pragmatis •• 51 
Pragmatl.m add. two important contributions to Jameats meta-
Ptt7aiC8 ot experience: the criterion of meaning, and the theory ot 
truth. Eaoh ot the.e will be discu.sed brietly 1n turn. 
Jame. state. that -the pragmatic method is primarily a method 
of settling metaphysical dispute. that otherwise might be intermin-
able. • • • ~t8 duty is) to interpret eaoh notion by tracing 1ts 
practioal oonsequence'e ft52 We saw betope that a concept's meaning 
1 
was involved with the fringe ot the ooftcept--the tendency toward 
future aotion and pract1cal consequence.. In order tn.t the mean-
ing ot the ooncept be judged correct, it 1. neoessary to t1nd out 
whether the practical con.equence. intended are the actual cons.-
S~aurice Saua, "The Development ot Jame.'s Pragmatism Prior 
to 1879," Journal 2! PhilosophI, XXX (January 19, 1933), 50. 
51Ct• a.am'. article reterred to above tor a complete working 
out ot his comparison ot Jamests earlier writing to thoae ot his 
later pragmatism, pp. 43-51. 
S2wl111am Jame., Pragmati.m, ed. Ralph Barton Perr1 (New York. 
1947), p. 45. 
r 
queuc.s worked out. This 1s done when the concept 1. put to work 
in tbe stream ot experience. As a canon ot meaning, therefore, the 
pragmat1c method is necessary, because only 1n the stream ot expel'-
lenee, whicb is the ultimate rea11ty, 1s tbere true meaningtulness. 
Ooncepts, being cuts or excerpts from the stream, need this cri-
terion to pass judgment on their meaning. 
The pragmatic crIterion ot meaning vas used only to penetrate 
the meaningfulne.s of concepts. Jame. proposed b1s theory ot 
truth •• a crIterion of their truthfulness. 
Por a pragmatist, "true Id.a~ ~ those ~ ~ ~ assimilate • 
."lldate, corroborate, !!lS. veri!}:_"S) Ooncepts, standing &ll')ne, 
.eleoted trom the stream are neither true nor talse. In order to 
judge the truth ot a concept, one must test the intended truth in 
its re.ults 1n the stream ot experience. Tbat is why Jame. writes 
that "truth bappens to an idea. It b:ecomes true, i. made true b,. 
eyent.. Its .,er1ty ~ in tact an event, a process, the process 
namel,. ot Terit7ing Itselt, its .,eritioatlon. Its Talidit,. is tbe 
process ot 1ts va11datiop.·S4 It is clear, tberetore, that pragma-
tism, as Perry sugge.ts, otfers radical empiricism a metaphysics ot 
truth and meaning. 
In this chapter we haye seen the development of James's phil.-
sophical thought beginning with the problems he saw in psychology 
S3Jame., Meanini .2! Trutb .. pp. v-Ti. 
S4:r'bid., p. v1. 
r 
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and progressing to his adoption or pure experience a8 the basic 
realit7. The specitic problem ot the conoept was only one or manT 
that initiated Jamea'a philosophioal quest. However, we have seen 
hints ot his solution to this speoitio problem ot oonoept when 
James disou8sed the continuity ot the stream and pragmatism. It 
has been necessar,. to give a rather rull treatment to this entire 
philosophioal development since many ot the ideas considered enter 
into James's oomplete resolution or the problem ot the conoept 
which will now be oonsidered in the next ohapter. 
r 
OHAPTER IV 
THE PROBLEM OF CONCEPT RESOLVED BY PURE EXPERIENOE 
Once James had comm1tted h1mself to pure exper1ence as the 
ultimate metaphysical realit7. he determined to work out a complet 
system. His death in 1910 prevented him from tinishing his pro-
posed s7nthesis. His nephew, HeDr1 Jamea, Jr., however, edited 
the manuscripts James had prepared. These are presented under the 
title Some Problems 2! PhilosoePl. 
In !2!! Problems 2! Philosophl. James returned to the problem 
ot the perceptual and conceptual worldS. He telt he now bad a 
tirm metaphysioal baais on which he could resolve tbe apparent 
d1tterences ot these two world.. With confidenoe be rejeoted the 
traditional intellectualist doctrine o~ concepts. The he ~roc.eded 
to till out and enrich the notion of concept he bad presented 1n 
the Princ1ples. 
The discus.ion ot the concept 1n this chapter will deal vith 
(1) James's rejection ot traditional dootrines on the concept, (2) 
his development ot the origin, character, and tunction ot the con-
cept, () the conclusions James draws trom hi. new anairsi. ot the 
concept. 
Jamel claimed that Plato was the originator ot the intellec-
66 
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tnalist doctrine, when he ~first thought ot concepts as torming an 
entlre17 separate world and treated this as the only object tit 
tor the stud7 ot immortal minds."l Thls Platonic influence carrie~ 
on throughout philosophy w1th the tendency to treat conception as 
more easential in knowledge than perception. Thes. philosophers, 
under the guidanoe ot Plato, considered the sen •• s as organs ot 
illusion and sensation as obscure and contused. "This," clal •• 
James, "is the traditional intellectualist oreed."2 
James thought he round the souroe of this Intellectualism in 
the uncritical babit ot defining. "Whenever we conceive a thing 
we detine it; and it we still don't understand, we define our deti-
nition.") This habit ot deflnition led the intellectualist philo-
sophers farther and farther trom the immedlate stream ot e~epl­
ence rrOQ which the concept was originally taken. When tho habit 
of derining has oarried these philosophers tar afield, ther blame, 
• 
not the concepts, but the perceptual t1ux. They even go so tar as 
to den, the perceptual part ot experienoe. and oonstruot an artl-
ticlal struoture by whioh they can explain thought and knowledge~ 
Beoause ot this artificial structure, James rejected the dootrine. 
ot Kant, Bradley, are.n, nnd ROTce.4 
Jr. 
lWll11am James, Some Problems ot Philosophy, ed. Henr7 James, 
(New York, 1940),-P;-7~. --
2Ibid • 
.......... 
3Ibid., 83. 
4Ibid., 84-85. 
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Apart from James'e rejection of traditional dootrines because 
of their artificial structures. he had positive reasons for rejec-
ting this emphasis on concepts which he thought to be excessive. 
In presenting these positive reasons he brought up the precis. 
paints ot conrllct between the perceptual and conceptual worlds. 
The main d1~ference betweon percepts and concepts is that 
"percepts are continuous and concepts are discrete. Not discrete 
in their being. for conceptIon as an ~ is part ot the tlux ot 
teeling, but discrete trom each other in their several meanings."> 
In conoeption, a part ot experienee is isolated and distinguished 
from the other parts ot experience. It that aam. part is looked 
.t perceptually. it has no meaning and is "found to telescope and 
compenetrate and dittuse into its nelghbors, n6 When James 8.18 
that concepts are not discrete 1n their being, he is pointing to 
his solution of the problem of concepts. As an act, conception is 
" 
~art of experience. Since the act of conceiving constItutes the 
~e1ng ot the concept, rather than its meaning, it Is Just as much 
~ part ot the stream ot experienee .s the percept is. 
Because ot the discreteness of their meaning, concepts are 
"torever inadequate to the ruln.ss ot the realitr to be known. w7 
~ealit1 eonsists ot existential partioulars as well as of essenees, 
5Ibid., 48. Compare James:. ! _P_lu_r_a_l_i_s_t_l~e Universe, pp. 282-2 8. 
6Ib1d., 49-$0. 
7Ib14 •• 78. 
r 
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and uniyersals. This total reality is known only in the perceptual 
flux. In order to prove the priority ot sensation, or peroeption., 
James proposed to prove that concepts were inadequate and that the, 
talsified the total reali t,._ Theae two points will b e discusse.d 
before Jamests positive oharaoteristios ot oonoeption are consid-
ered. 
OonQeption is a secondary prooess whioh presupposes percep-
tion. ttTo understand a ooncept you must know what it means. It 
means always some this, or aome abstract portion ot a this, with 
which we first made acquaintanoe in 'the perceptual world. ft8 Be-
tore any conoeption is possible, there must be perception. Jame. 
says that "all eonceptual oontent is borrowed."9 Even if one con-
siders oonceptions arising from previous conceptions, the original 
concepts wero direotly from peroeptual eXperienoe. Thus, being 
.eoondary formationa, concepts arei.Jlfl~~quate to express the tuI-
ness or reality. 
Since concepts lire inadequate, the aspect they give or real-
ity is d18to~ted. They leave out part ot the peroeptual flux by 
their very nature. This has led philosophers, erroneously, to 
reje:::t the perceptual flux a8 unreal. 10 James attz-1butea two rea-
sona for the inadequacy of conception. 
8Ib1d., 19. 
9I !?14_ 
lOIbld., 80.81. 
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When concepts are subst1tuted tor percepts, their relationa 
are substituted also. "But since the relations ot concepts are ot 
statio comparison only, it is impossible to substitute them tor the 
d)'llamic relations with which the perceptual flux 1s tilled. nil hett 
though the concept might designate a part ot the flux that was ac-
tive, the oonoept remains or an intrinsically stationary nature 
~hich does not change even though its terms symbolize changing 
originals. 
The second reason ror the inadequacy of conception 1s that 
"the conoeptual 8obeme,cons1sting as it does of discontinuous 
terms. can only cover the perceptual flux in spots and 1noomplet •• 
17."12 Concepts are the substantive parts or the rlux and they 
rail to represent the transitive teatures which are so 1mportant. 
James liked to compare the conceptucl system to a map. Concepts 
!are the oities marked on the map, but: theY' are worthless ~~thout 
-the oonnecting roads and highways which represent the perceptual 
~low or experience. 
In James·s mind concepts and percepts are "so interlaced, and 
~~ lif. rests on them so interohangea~ly and undiscrlminatingly, 
that it is otten dIfficult to impart quickl~ to beginners a clear 
13 ~otion ot the ditterence meant." He found them so entwIned that 
llIb1d _.,. 81. 
12Ibid• 
-
llIbid •• 47. 
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It ¥as dltticult to speak ot one without bringing In the other. It 
1. neoess&r7, theretore, in our disoussion to proceed oautiously 
in order to get the proper notlon ot ooncept. To achieve our pur-
pose, we will div1de thls .econd part ot our discusslon, the devel-
op.ent ot the conoept, into a treatment ot the origln, oontent and 
funct10n, value, and purpose of the concept. Finally, we will 
., 
present James's tlu1 .tatement OD the concept. 
In the act ot oonoe1ving, the mind, through attention, •• -
leota certain objeot. trom the percept~l tlux ot experlence. Then 
the m1nd lWIe. and Identitles these objecta. It .a78 ".!!!!i eaoh 
part ot the .enslb1e continuum ia, and all the.e ab.tracted what. 
are concepts."14 
When J.... discu •• e. the content and the tunction ot the oon-
oept, he u.e. the conoept ot man a. an example. He .a78 this OOn-
oept, and all ooncepta, "1. three thing.: 1, the word ItseltJ 2, 
" 
a vague plcture ot the human torm whioh has It. own value In the 
wa7 ot beauty or not, and ), an Inatrument tor .,mbollsing certain 
objeota trom wh10h we __ ,. expect human treatment when oooa.lon ar-
rive •• HIS The vague torm 1. the nuoleus or topic ot the conoept. 
Thia 18 the part iao1ated trom the flux and named. !his ls what 
the oonoept 1. about. Ho matter how valuble thi. part -7 be, 
"the more important part of ita !lhe oonoepttiJ .1gnltio~~e ma,. 
141h14., so. 
151b14., S8. 
r 
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naturallr be held to be the consequenoes to which it lead.. The.e 
may lie either in the way ot making u. thInk, or 11'1 the way ot mak-
ing us act. Whoever bas a clear idea ot these knows .flectlyelf 
what the ooncept practically signltie •• ftl6 Thus J .... insists that 
the tunotional value of the conoept Is more important than the 
content. 
The funotional aape.t ot concepta, whioh lead ua to think or 
to act, receIve. Ita value trom the tact that concepts oan be IUb-
stituted tor percepts. In tact, most adults spend their time in 
this substItution prooess. "The intellectual lit • .2! .an consists 
A.~lt wholll !!. h!!. substitution 2!. ~ conceptual order lS?!:. !h!. 
peroeptual order ~ which h!! experience 01'1811'18111 comes."l7 
ThPoUSh thi8 8ubstitution man 18 led to concepts ot a higher order 
and to a tuller latelleotual lIte. 
Oonoepts are .0 frequent in adult lite that they appear as 
tralns--each one is discrete. but ooupled with the next by a rela-
tionship tound in the tringe of eaoh. Just as the mind, through 
attention, s1ngled out oertain parts ot the perceptual tlow. so It 
singles out parts ot the conceptual train. Thi. is the orlg1n ot 
concepts ot a hIgher order ot abstractness. l8 
Because ot the power ot manta mind to discern and single out 
l6Ib1d., S9. 
-
17Ib1d., S1. 
18Ib1d• 
-
,I 
I 
i 
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thele high.~ concepts, there is no llmit to what can be conceived. 
When new relationl are touad between these conoeptl, ne" worlds of 
knowledge &rise. Theae new relatlons enable man to .et up various 
loheme. of tlxed order, such aa we have in mathematlc. or other 
8.prlori scienoe.. James would gl". va11d1t,. to thls proce.s, In-
liltlng that "tbe terma are indeed man-made, but the order, being 
established sole17 b7 compariaon, 1. flxed by the nature ot the 
terms on the one hand an4 by our power ot percet ... ing relationa on· 
the othe~.1t19 
James realized that th1s was -the way man's mind dealt with the 
reallt1 presented to It. Man's understanding ot "any mass ot per-
ceptual tact consiata in assimilatlng 1ts concr.te terms, one bJ 
one, to so many term. ot the conceptual series, and then in assum-
iag, that the relations lntultlvely tound among the latter are 
wbat connect the tormer_ n2O Thls inducti.e-hJ'pothesls method, 
who •• value he bad learned trom his early scientltic tralning, 
Jamel attributed to oonoeption. ThroUSh lt there 1s a theoretlc 
conquest .... er the order 1n wbich. nature originally comes. It alao 
brings "the revelation ot a deeper level ot rea11ty ln thlngs_ Be-
ing more constant, it i8 truer, leis 111ua0PJ' than the perceptual 
order, and ought to oommand our attent10n .ore."21 
19]:b14., 69. 
20Ibi!., 70. 
211b1je, 11. 
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conceptI have a aecond value beaidel that ot knowledge of a 
higher order. TheT help man to revalue his life. lames oompare. 
their relation to peroepts with the relation of sight to touch. 
Through light man is prepared tor the things with which he must 
come into contact. Likewise, concepts prepare man tor his future 
lit. in the perceptual tlux of experience. This toreknowledge 
gives meaning to life, it arouses "new feelings of sublimity, pow-
eri and admiration, new interests and motivatlons.-22 
80 t8~ in discussing the positive development ot James's no-
tion ot concept, we have treated the origin, content and function, 
and the value of oonception. Now we must discuss its purpose. 
Despite the excellence of its SUbstitutional value .. the pri-
mary purpose ot conception is to guide man in his lite in the per-
ceptual world ot experience. The conceptual world opens up the 
tut1,lPe ot the pel'oeptual world and helps to give it meani~. Con-
" 
caption helps man to harness perceptual reality so that he can 
guide it in his own interests. "With concepts," James writes, "we 
~o in quest ot the absent, meet the remote, actively turn this wal 
or that, bend our experience, and make it tell us whither it is 
~ound. We change its order, run it backwards, bring tar bits to-
~8ther and separate near bits, jump about over its lurtace instead 
pf plowing through its oontlnult7, string its items on as many ide. 
ilil diagrams as our mind oan .frame. All these are way. ot handliB6 
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23 the peroeptual flux and •• eti91 dietant parts ot it." Thus con-
ception t s priaary .funotion is to adapt lIan prac'i.;ical11 to the to-
talit1 ot the perceptual world in which he liye •• 
In the last analysis, man needs both percepts and concepts 
for the oompleteness ot his lite. Thor must work together. They 
"interpenetrate and melt together, impregnate and fertilize eaoh 
other. Neither, taken along, ~novs realit,. in its completeness. 
~e need them both, a8 W& need both our legs to walk With_ ft24 J .... 
concludes br "allowing oonceptual knowledge to be selt-suffioing, 
~bil. at the same t1me ••• maintaining.that the full value of 
such knowledge i8 got on1, by combining it with perceptual reality 
&g&1n.,,25 
Now that Jamssfs reJeotion ot the traditional doctrines on 
oonoept and tho positive develop.ent of his own doctrine have been 
discussed, it is necessary to turn to:: the third and final part ot 
" 
" his discussion ot the concept. Once he felt that his position had 
been established, there were a number ot concluaions which tlowed 
from this. We will now discuss eaoh of these conclusions a8 they 
appeared to James. 
Jame. telt that his sattstactory explanation ot conception 
and his rejection ot intellectualism oont1~ed bis adoption ot em-
2lIbld., 64. 
24,oid., 52-53. 
2Stb1d., S8. 
piriciam. This is the first and primary corollary that James 
thought followed ~rom his preoeding analysis of the concept. 
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WItb empiric1sm fontirmed, novelty in the universe becomes 
possible,. "In human experience the parts are percepts, built out 
into wholes by our conceptual additions. The percepts are singu-
lars that change Incessantl1 and never return exaotly as they were 
belore. This brings an element of concrete novelty lnto our ex-
26 perl.nee." Here again James stresses the primaoy ot the percep-
tual world and sensation. He admits that concepts are useful, but 
the,. "can never .fitl,. supersede perception_"27 
'lhls does not mean, however, that concepts and their relations 
are not just as real, in their own wa,., as percepts are. Th1. 1. 
Jame.'. third oonclusion. He goes on to define what he means b,. 
~eal as "anything 1s real ot whioh we tind ourselves obliged to 
take account in &n7 way."~8 With sueh a definition, it is clear 
" 
" 
that conoepts must be real. However, he warns that th~ realit7 
~hioh concepts enjoy is inferior to that ot percepts, because it 
is so static and schematic and laoks many or the oharacteristics 
~hich peroeptual reality enJo78. 
A fourth conclusion is that the self-sameness of ideal object. 
~s oonti~ed. A concept, by its ver7 nature, alwaTs means the same 
261'01d• , 98. 
27Ibltd.t, 100. 
281 bide', 101. 
11 
thing. "On this selt-sameness of oonceptua1 objects tne statio 
and 'eternal' oharacter ot our systems ot ideal t~uth is based: 
for a relation, once peroelTed to obtain, must obtain always, be-
tween terms that do not a1ter."29 He denies the nominalist posi-
tion that a ooncept, used in different contexts as intrinsically 
the same, 1s only a n~,e. He says that the ooncept "same" means 
"either (a) that no difterence can be round between • • • two ob-
jects when compared, or (b) that we can substitute the one tor 
the other in oertain operations with,ut 3hanging the result.")O 
James felt that many philosophers contused a ooncept of the "same" 
with the same physioal qualitr. For example, these philosophers 
did not thlnk the wh1teness ot the snow, taken as a physioa1 prop-
erty, could be the same as the whiteness of paper. James conolude. 
that "our meanings can be the same as often as we intend to have 
them so, quite irrespective of whether what is meant by a physioal 
possibility or not.")l 
What James is trying to affirm in this notion of the selt-
sameness ot ideal objects is "the platonic doctrine that conoepts 
are singulars, that oonoept-stuff 18 inalterable, and that Pb7si-
oal rea11ties are oonstituted by the Tarious c~noept-stutrs of 
which they 'partake. t It is known as flogical realism- in the 
29Ibld., 102. 
30lbld., 10). 
3l~., lO~. 
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history ot Philosophy.".32 James admitted that this ma.y seem con-
tradictory tor an empiricist, but 141a purpose w~s "to combine logi-
cal realism with an otherw1se empi:r'ioiat mode ot thought. ,,3.3 
Jam$S'S tinal conclusion is that concepts and percepts are 
consubstantial; that is, "'I;hey are made of the same kind of. sturr, 
anJ melt into each othel~ -;.,rhen we handle th.em t03ether. ".34 It 1s 
ditl"ieult, he contends, to tell how llluch of: mants mental life 1s 
gotten trom sense and h("w liluch trom conception. l1an oonatantly 
uses both, and they both interact on him. He claims that thtlse 
"two mental tunotions thus play into eac~ otherta hands. Per-
oeption prompts our thought It and thought in turn enl'iches our per-
ception. The mora we see, the more we think; while the more we 
think, the more we Boe in our immediate experiences. and the grea-
ter grows th~ detail and th6 more significant th~ articulateness 
ot our perception. n3S 
With these oonclusions whioh James draws trom his tinal ex-
planation of concept, as enrl~hed by pU1~e exporience, We finish 
our exposition of James's notion of concept as tound in his psy-
onalogical and philosophical writings. In the last ohapter, a tew 
oonolusions must be drawn and a tew observntions made. 
34Ibid., 107. 
-.35Ibld~. 108-109. 
-
CRAPTER V 
SOME CONCLUSIONS AND OBSIRVATIONS 
Bow that we baTe discussed James's notion ot the concept as h' 
presented and deyeloped it in his ps,.chology and philosoPDJ. we 
might ask how James's notion ot the conoept compares with the trad-
itional scholastic notion. It vould see. that James was anti-
scholastic in .s much as he considered Icholastic1.. as a torm ot 
the intellectualil. which he had rejected. The discussion will be-
gin with a prelim1&r7 comment on the teleological purpose ot con-
cept in James, then one major point ot comparison will be discussed 
ThPoughout his development ot the notlon ot concept, James 
Insisted that it is a teleological instrument and that it is more 
", 
important tunctionall,. than as a conte~t. The main reason" tor 
thls .eems to be James's denial ot the power ot the mind to grasp 
reallt,. in its completeness. "We have," be wrote, "no organ or 
tacult7 to appreclate the simpl,. given order. The real world as it 
is given objeotivel,. at this moment Is the sum total ot all Its 
belngs and eTent. now ••.•• It i. an order with which ve have 
nothing to do but to get avay trom it as fast as possible. nl 
lWilliam James, "Reflex Action and Thelsm," EssaXI on Faith 
~ Moral" &4. aalph Barton Perr,. (lev York, 1941), pp.-r18-11Q. 
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There aeem to be two reaaoDa tor this denial. Jame.'a acien-
titic background, with ita evolutionary tendencies, made hi. se. 
the world ot knowl.dge evolYing to a more and more pertect atate. 
Whatever is known is juat a portion ot all there ia to be known. 
Though knowledge mA7 increaae and become morepertect, there will 
a1w&71 be more which the mind can never tull, .... p. 
Jamelta peraonal experienc.a, also, prepared him tor thil de-
nial. In his earl, tite he could not aasimilate, intellectuall" 
the problems and triala he experienoed. As a result ot these, he 
developed the notion ot the "will to believe." This was an admis-
.1on that certain problem. could not be solved intellectuall" but 
had to be taken to the VolItional level In order that man could 
assimilate the. into hls dal1, lite aati.tactor117. 
Oon.equant on this denial ot the power ot the mind, Jam.1 
subordinated intellect to wlll. In order that man live harmoniOUI-
, 
. 
17 in thl1 world and control it, as mUOh as he could, James bad to 
~e17 on a principle other than tntellect. ae gave primar, impor-
tance, theretore, to the will. Thus knowledge and the concept be. 
came teleological inatruments lubordlnated to the command of the 
,ersonal intereats of the will. 
With priaac, given to the teleological aspect ot the concept, 
~ames mitigated the content ot the concept. Por him this vaa the 
~ealt t.portant part ot the concept, and he ne.er aeemed to glYe 
~ olear notion of just what the content ot the concept should be. 
~hls vasueDess leads UI to a consideration ot Jamestl metbod in 
I 
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developing the notion ot the concept, and tinally a comparison ot 
his method with the scholastic method. 
fbro~gh introspection and descr1ptive psychology Jame. con-
sidered the concept as a retlex percept. fhe mind singles it out 
ot the stream ot thought and 1dentitiel 1t as being the aame as a 
previous thought. Once singled out, the concept can be separated 
trom the context w1th which it was received by the conoentration 
ot attention. Finally, with the expansion ot conoentration to the 
fringe tendencies, the concept can become univerltal or particulu. 
fhia, 1n general, would be the method ot descriptive pSl0hol-
ogr_ Once tbe oonoept is singled out, it could be considered. a 
name tor various members ot a class, 1t could be considered as a 
qualitl which is found in various individuals; or It could be 
considered as the basic concept-atutt which other being. partici-
pate. 
Prom hia uae of thia method, Jame. did arrive at some philo-
sophical notion 01' the concept. It waa a piece, a part along with 
all els., ot pure experienoe. Though it talsitled reallty to a 
degree, It was a necelearl instrument in ahaping the rich variety 
ot realltl in pure experienoe. Pinally, it vas ins.parably oon-
nected with the percept and the perceptual tlux. 
J.an Wahl oonoludes trom thl. that "J .... is a nominalist, a 
conoeptualist, and a realist in turn. He i8 a nominalist in the 
sense that the 'particular concrete' alone possesses protound trut 
and real worth tor hlm. He i8 a oonceptualist in the sense that. 
I 
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1n his mind, there exists around our particular ideas a fringe of 
general meaning, and, on tne other hand, that there is a certain 
element ot generality in things."2 In Jame.'s aftirmation that 
"conoept-stuft is inalterable, and that physical realities are 
constituted by the various concept-stutts ot which they partake.") 
Wahl sees him as a realist • 
. 
The scholastic notion ot the ooncept, on the other hand, 1s de. 
veloped philosophioally and with a philosophical method. It is 
tirmly rooted in a basic metaphysios and theory ot knowledge that 
are based on tirst principle. ot being and knowledge. That the 
mind can know and attain truth and tberebr gain a certain Mastery 
over the world of being is one ot its primary and undeniable prin-
ciples. Jam •• tried to u •• an inverse prooe •• and attempted to 
build a metaphysics and theory ot knowledge trom the problems he 
recognized in de.oriptiye psroholoQJ·. but ne oould not crolla the 
" 
" bridge between scientitic and philosophical psyolwlogr successtul-
11, though he realized there was a bridge to be crossed. 
In oonclusion, James held tenaciously to the traditional no-
tions and validity ot conoeptual knowledge. ae enriched and d.ten-
ded the notion of conoept against the scientific and philosophical 
misoonceptions about it 1n hi. day. In tact, it would •••• that 
James would hay. aooepted the scholastic notion ot the ooncept it 
2Jean Wahl, The Pluralist P~loso2hie. ot Ensland and Amerioa, 
trans. Fred Rothwerr (tondon, -14 ), p. 11>0.- -
",bid., 161. 
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he had known what it was in a more speoific way, and if he had not 
rejected it as a part of other intelleotualist theoPies. 
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